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THE JOURN YLJURISPRUDENCE
TAKING STARE DECISIS SERIOUSLY
James G. Wilson*
Abstraca
This article assumes that President Obama's election begins a gradual
progressive transformation of the Supreme Court. To help determine the
appropriate scope of judicial review, should such a change arise, the article
separates stare decisis analysis into descriptive and normative factors. To build
the model, it uses closely contested cases, won by conservatives. Even if one
does not agree with this article's particular normative assessments of any
particular issue, the descriptive model is an important contribution to the
enduring debate about the role of precedent in constitutional adjudication. The
model also demonstrates the virtual impossibility of having any systematic
theory of stare decisis.
This article recommends that any future liberal Court should not be very
"judicially active." It should be reluctant to overturn many prior conservative
victories or to create numerous novel constitutional rights. Liberals may balk at
this proposal. On the other hand, conservatives will dislike the article's
ideological assumption that our society needs to move in a much more
progressive direction. I fear excessive judicial activism could undermine any
political effort to create a widespread Congressional coalition to resolve such
pressing issues as environmental degradation, resource depletion, wealth
inequality, and economic decline. For example, a liberal Court should not
eliminate the individual's right to bear arms under the Second Amendment set
forth in Hqe//er, because it would alienate white, rural working class voters. This
article is not standard fare.
I. Introduction
This article hypothesizes that President Obama's 2008 election signified a
political/constitutional shift, similar to President Nixon's triumph in 1968.
After Nixon's victory, American Presidents selected Supreme Court nominees
who were more conservative than the Warren Court majority.' At this point, it
is impossible to predict Justice Sotomayor's and Justice Kagan's constitutional
Professor, Cleveland State University.
Republican successes in the 2010 midterms demonstrate that Obama's election may not have
been a major turning point.
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jurisprudence, but they may not be very aggressive.2 But should they be? Any
emerging liberal majority would have the power to revisit closely contested
constitutional decisions that earlier liberals lost-the five-to-four and six-to-
three conservative victories that have been the focus of most liberal political
and academic ire. To help answer that question, this constitutional hypothetical
reconsiders many narrowly decided cases, won by conservatives, to create a
descriptive model of stare decisis which lawyers across the political spectrum
should find useful.
The article's normative perspective is more disquieting: many liberals will
disagree with the degree of deference it gives to prior adjudications, while many
conservatives will oppose the primary reason for that passivity: the Supreme
Court needs to withdraw more from the political arena, particularly the Culture
Wars, to enable average Americans to find common ground to elect leaders
who will address such pressing issues as economic decline, wealth inequality,
resource depletion, and environmental degradation.' For example, liberals
should not revisit the limited right of individuals to bear arms established in
Heller v. District of Columbia4 and McDonald v. Chicago.5 Overruling those opinions
would alienate many white, rural citizens needed for significant political change.
Thus, this approach is more cautious than most of the proposals set forth in
The Constitution in 2020. 6 In that book, liberal scholars primarily discussed how
current constitutional doctrine should be improved. None of the chapters
dwelled on stare decisis, particularly as applied to conservative opinions.
No single factor is determinative under stare decisis. The wide range of
justifications favoring stare decisis (and the countervailing reasons to ignore
precedent) often conflict and are frequently incommensurable. Stare decisis
requires a malleable adjudicatory methodology that should drive anyone seeking
a unified theory of constitutional law to despair. Any Justice who is thinking of
overruling a prior case has to compare the earlier case's reasoning, outcome,
and impact with that Justice's own complex constitutional ideology, which
should contain a significant degree of deference to precedent. This article
structures this multifaceted process by first considering "descriptive factors,"
variables that are relatively easy to measure. It next looks at normative factors
most lawyers support. Finally, it considers the more divisive norms that are at
2 See Jeffrey Tobin, Bench Press: Are Obama'sjudges Rea/ y Liberals?, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 21,
2009, at 32.
1 This argument also applies to any future liberal creation of numerous "new rights" and to
moving far beyond the text to create unenumerated rights and powers. See, e.g., MARK V.
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AwAY FROM THE COURT (2000).
4 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
5 561 U.S. (2010).
6 SeeJack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The Constitution in 2020 (2009).
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the heart of any controversial decision. Stare decisis means, at a minimum, that
new Supreme Court Justices should integrate their constitutional jurisprudence
into the existing framework, even though they would have decided many prior
cases differently.
By focusing on selected closely-contested cases, itself a major stare decisis
factor, this essay is only a first step in understanding the Court's steady drift to
the right. A thorough analysis would consider all previous cases. However, the
daunting task of making an overall assessment of conservative jurisprudence,
which has recently become far more assertive, requires someone as gifted,
inspired, and sympathetic as the late John Hart Ely, who eloquently and
gracefully reconfigured existing constitutional law to strengthen most Warren
Court jurisprudence while criticizing such controversial decisions as Roe v.
Wade. Nevertheless, this article's less ambitious inquiry, which sifts through the
battleground of contentious cases with an often saddened and skeptical eye,
may assist anyone attempting to duplicate Ely's dazzling achievement.
The choice between retaining and reversing any decision resides deep within
the soul of each adjudicator. The article's final section briefly reconsiders
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.' Five Justices overruled Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which held that legislatures could regulate
corporate political speech. Believing that Citizens United threatens any healthy
conception of republican government, this article recommends that Citizens
United (as well as aspects of Buckle v. Valeo') be over-ruled as quickly as
possible.
II. Descriptive Factors
In Citzens United, the lead opinion and the dissenting opinion reduced the
number of stare decisis factors to four: workability, antiquity of the precedent,
the reliance interests at stake, and whether the decision was well-reasoned.11
Numerous considerations reside under those factors. Rather than duplicate the
Court's approach, this section discusses several additional, traditional stare
decisis factors that are relatively easy to ascertain: the number of Justices
initially favoring a challenged opinion, the number of concurring opinions, the
form of the doctrine, and subsequent litigation.
7John Hart Ely, Democracy & Distrust: A Theor of Judicial Review (1980).
8 558 U.S. 1 (2010).
9 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
SId.(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A. Longevity of Precedent
Nothing is easier than determining the date when the Court decided a prior
opinion. But that seemingly straightforward issue requires the Court to consider
the other three Citiz ens United factors. If the challenged opinion has been
around for many decades, it has proven to be somewhat "workable." Any
decline in workability has probably been caused by subsequent judicial (and
even popular) hostility towards the doctrine, rather than the doctrine itself.
Long-enduring opinions also imbed themselves into the nation's cultural and
legal system, generating "reliance." Such opinions have a patina of authority.
On the other hand, more recently decided opinions reflect current mores and
understandings-making them more salient and possibly more controversial.
P/essy v. F~erguson, for instance, had survived the test of time, was easy to enforce,
helped create and perpetuate the Southern racial system, and provided a
pseudo-egalitarian doctrine that kept the Supreme Court from confronting the
South for many decades. Today, almost everyone thinks P/essy was poorly
reasoned because of its odious results, not just its cruelly abstract doctrine.
Furthermore, the date of the challenged opinion can obscure a crucial issue, the
longevity of the challenged practice. In Citizens United, the Court struck down a
relatively recent decision, but the legislative branches had prohibited direct
corporation contributions for over a century. Thus, the conservatives ignored a
"constitutional tradition" that is also part of the constitutional calculus.
B. Initial Distribution of Votes and Concurrences
1. Closely-Contested Cases
Why focus on closely contested cases, the five-to-four and six-to-three opinions
won by Justices conventionally considered "conservative?" First, Justices have
emphasized the closeness of the original vote. 12 Because so many Supreme
Court opinions have so many political ramifications, a divided opinion usually
reflects a divided electorate, while a unanimous opinion often intimates
widespread agreement. There is a perpetual tension between the elite and the
masses in this society, as in every other. American leaders, including Supreme
Court Justices, risk a severe backlash if they deviate too far from overall public
12See, e.g., Pa'yne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), ovenru/ing Booth v. Ma/alnd, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)
and South Caro/ina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (justifying the inapplicability of stare decisis, in
part, because the two prior cases "were decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited
dissents challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions"). Conversely, unanimous
decisions deserve greater reverence. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 723 (1995)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), (denouncing the majority's "disregard [for] the respect due a
unanimous decision").
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opinion. De Tocqueville acutely described the limits of legal authority in the
United States:
The majority [of the people in the United States], therefore, exercise a
prodigious actual authority, and a moral influence which is scarcely less
preponderant; no obstacles exist which can impede, or so much as retard its
progress, or which can induce it heed the complaints of those whom it crushes
upon its path.13
This essay seeks to avoid facile reductionism: many decisions cannot be
explained in terms of partisan politics or immediate ideological preferences.
Indeed, one of the stare decisis's virtues is that its norm of judicial consistency
can trump those impulses. The process of common law adjudication, like all
forms of practical reason, cannot be reduced to a few variables. Some cases are
"hard" because there is a basic lack of agreement among the Justices about
what should be done. Others are "hard" because Justices are caught in a
constitutional crossfire: various factors pull in opposing directions. Indeed, the
doctrine of stare decisis remains perpetually murky and erratic in application
because it asks a Justice to trump other, more contemporary norms leading the
Justice to believe an opinion was initially misguided.14 Such tensions, which
create malleable uncertainty, are desirable. Stare decisis pulls a Justice away
from the immediate political world and reinforces his or her institutional
commitment to the legal system. To the degree that a tradition is strong,
validated by longevity and by an initial decision that cuts across the existing,
albeit forever shifting conservative/liberal divide, the new Justice should be
more willing to abide.
1. Concurring Opinions
Along with close votes, another indicator of doctrinal vulnerability is a plethora
of concurring opinions. While most five-to-four opinions raise the
straightforward question of whether or not one agrees with the decision, the
multiple-opinion case is harder to decipher.5 That lack of guidance weakens
13 I)F TocQuIxIIIF, supra note -at 301.
14 See \lichael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis
Require Adherence to the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. Rnv.
1165, 1171 (2008) ("What defines the doctrine of stare decisis as a judicial practice -which
gives the doctrine am punch at all - is adherence to what a court, by hypothesis, otherwise
would regard as an erroneous exposition of law.").
15 The Court has adopted a singular approach for determining the "holding" of a plurality
decision. "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . Marks v.
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these cases, making them less "workable." Conversely, such complex
determinations are easier to retain, because future Justices can seize upon
language in a concurrence to alter the primary opinion.
Except during the Civil Rights era and the Civil War, federalism has been of
more interest to the intelligentsia than the average citizen. For conservative
lawyers, it has been a rallying point: they named their most influential and
famous organization The Federalist Society. Supreme Court Justices Rehnquist,
Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas have often protected States from the
federal government and individual litigants.1" Putting that norm into practice
has not always been easy. United States v. Lopez attempted to shift much power
from the federal government to the States by limiting Congressional power
under the Commerce Clause.1 In that five-to-four decision, conservatives
invalidated a federal law criminalizing bringing firearms into public schools.18
However, the conservatives failed to speak with a unified voice. In his majority
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the federal government
overreached for several reasons: (1) Congress failed to demonstrate that guns in
schools had a substantial effect on interstate commerce; 19 (2) Congress failed to
require the prosecution to provide adequate proof that it had jurisdiction; 20 (3)
the defendant had not engaged in any economic transaction;21 (4) States had
primary responsibility for running school systems; 22 and (5) Congress cannot
easily expand the scope of federal criminal law. 23 Justice Thomas' ambitious
concurrence questioned much Congressional legislation since the New Deal: "I
am aware of no cases prior to the New Deal that characterized the power
flowing from the Commerce Clause as sweepingly as does our substantial
effects test. * * * If anything, the 'wrong turn' was the Court's dramatic
departure in the 1930's from a century and a half of precedent., 24 In their
concurrence, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy repudiated Thomas's vision:
"Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that we
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion
of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.))
16 See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TFx. L. RF'x. 1 (2004).
1 United States v. Lope% 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also Chris Marks, Comment, U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton and United States v. Lopez: The Supreme Court Resuscitates the Tenth Amendment,
68 U. COLO. L. REv. 541, 553-564 (1997).
18 Lope% 514 U.S. at 551.
19 Id. at 561.
20 Id. at 561-62.
21 Id. at 561.
22 Id. at 564-66.
23 Id. at 562-67.
24 Id. at 596, 599.
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have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable national
economy."25 These concurrences represent a major ideological split among
judicial conservatives. Indeed, the fate of the recently passed Health Care bill
will probably come down to Justice Kennedy's application of his concurrence's
general principle to the requirement that individuals must purchase health care
from private insurance companies.
While some conservatives foresaw a constitutional revolution,26 many liberal
critics believed that the Court would apply Rehnquist's criteria in a haphazard,
result-oriented way of little importance.2 The main beneficiaries would be
lawyers and legal theorists, who would argue endlessly about Rehnquist's
factors, which had replaced the prior bright line rule completely deferring to
Congressional use of the commerce clause power in social and economic
situations.28 The Kennedy/O'Connor approach prevailed, which came as little
surprise, because O'Connor and Kennedy have been the crucial swing votes in
most closely contested cases. There has been no wholesale assault on regulatory
capitalism at the constitutional level. The conservatives have struck down a few
laws, most notably Congress's attempt to provide more protection to women
by criminalizing gender-motivated violence in United States v. Morrison.2' But
majorities have erratically applied the malleable factors in Lopez in ways that can
best be explained by the ideological preferences of the Justices (it is harder to
determine the viewpoints of Justices who uphold challenged laws, because one
cannot know if they personally supported the law or just found it a valid
exercise of legislative power). According to fluctuating majorities on the Court,
Congress could protect the privacy of state drivers' licenses from intrusive
questioning" and prohibit the use of freely distributed medical marijuana even
though there was no commercial transaction. 1 Overall, there has been no
cataclysm, merely erratic confusion.1
2
25 Id. at 574.
26 See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Washbingto, Gets Amendment Fever, NAT'L L.J., June 5, 1995, at Al
(quoting Professor Bernstein of New York Law School stating "We're seeing the most
remarkable shift in public thinking about government and where governmental responsibilities
should be placed since FDR.").
27 See, e.g., Barry C. Toone & Bradley J. Wiskirchen, Great Expectations: The Illusion of Federalism
After United States v. Lopez, 22 J. LECIs. 241, 264 (1996).
28 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
29 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
30 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
31 GonZales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
32 Many commentators have discussed the ambiguous status of federalism in the Supreme
Court after GoiZa/es. See e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Essay, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Federalism iN the
Rehhquist Court, 31 HARIT. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 761 (2008); Casey J. Carhart, Note, Wi/i the Ever-
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What should be done with this potpourri of cases and doctrines? A liberal
majority would never join Justice Thomas's crusade against the New Deal.
However, they should not overrule Lopez and Morrison. First, the decisions have
not done much damage. The States can and do punish those who carry guns
into schools and commit sexually motivated assaults on women.33 The existence
or nonexistence of the law in Morrison would have little, if any, deterrent effect
on would-be rapists.34 Second, it is easy to apply this commerce clause doctrine
less rigorously. Congress can establish relatively trivial jurisdictional
requirements, such as requiring that the Justice Department prove that any gun
brought into a school contains parts manufactured outside the state.35 If the
liberals wish to reconsider Morrison without overruling Lope.I they can easily
manipulate the degree of deference to Congressional "findings," stating that
Congress has provided sufficient evidence. There is no objective way to infer
when a legislature has proven the "need" to do something after considering a
wide range of studies, listening to testimony, and gathering anecdotes." Behind
every legal inference lurks a complex jurisprudence. Furthermore, there is
hardly any judicial adjective more malleable than "substantial" and any judicial
noun pliable than the casual notion of "effects." "
A future progressive Court also might want to consider keeping Lopez alive, if
not totally ambulatory. One mixed blessing of Lopez is that it makes it more
difficult for Congress to plunge into the cultural wars that have divided and
distracted this country for decades. If Congress cannot pass a law protecting
women from sexual assault when the States have been enforcing such laws for
centuries, Congress may not be able to punish adultery, overconsumption of
junk food, teenage drinking, homosexuality, and flag burning. Admittedly, the
Court has protected some of these activities under other textual provisions,
38
but there is no harm in having two constitutional bulwarks instead of one. Of
course, it is hard to draw any principled, easily applicable constitutional line in
Singing Pendulum of Commerce Clause Intepretations Ever Stop? A Casenote on Gonzales v. Raich, 27
WHITTIER L. REV. 833 (2006)
33 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581.
34 See Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, & the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation & Prevention,
87 CAL. L. RLV. 827, 924 (1999).
35 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62 (implicitly providing for a jurisdictional hook which would
render a commerce clause quandary moot); Vlorison, 529 U.S. at 611-12.
37 See GonZa/es, 545 U.S. at 67 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he 'substantial effects' test is a
'rootless and malleable standard' at odds with the constitutional design.") (quoting Morrison,
529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
38 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas anti-sodomy statute);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (providing First Amendment protection to flag burning as
expressive conduct);
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terms of the commerce power. Most of us want the federal government to
prosecute kidnappers and terrorists, even when they are uninterested in money.
Nor can liberals easily protect medical use of marijuana: the federal government
should be able to outlaw any drug it believes is dangerous, whether purchased
or not.
Because legal reasoning resembles a simultaneous equation containing
numerous variables, this article's choice of a contested case, as it just did with
Lopet to exemplify particular stare decisis variables can be misleading. All the
factors influence or should influence any reconsideration (of course, this
article's list of factors is contestable in terms of inclusion, omission, and
exclusion). In other words, there are other, more important reasons why Lopez
should or should not be retained than the fact that the winning side spoke with
three different voices.
A. The Form of the Doctrine
For quite some time, there has been a debate about the comparative value of
"bright line" rules versus "balancing tests."-39 Justice Scalia asserted in a law
review article that the "rule of law" should consist of the "law of rules," i.e.,
bright lines."' On the Court, he has frequently castigated his colleagues for
employing pliable balancing tests, for acting like "Mr. Fix-it."41 Justice Scalia is
overreacting: just as it is useful to regulate traffic with posted speed limits,
which are rigid rules, it is also desirable to supplement those laws with the more
indeterminate standard of "reckless driving," even though that standard gives
police discretion that they may abuse. This section considers how the Court's
chosen form of doctrine interacts with stare decisis without concluding that
either form is innately preferable. Rules and standards have different,
foreseeable effects, costs, and benefits. 42 To the degree that a doctrine is a
formal rule requiring little or no discretion in application, it is difficult to
distinguish or dilute.43 A party easily wins whenever it can prove the facts that
trigger the rule. Thus, bright line rules provide "workability" because of ease of
applicability. Yet balancing tests provide a different type of "workability" due to
their flexible responsiveness to different fact patterns.
39 See, e.g., James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line - Balancing
Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773 (1995) [hereinafter "Forms of Doctrine"].
40 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law ofRu/e, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
41 See Hamdi v. Rumfe/d, 542 U.S. 507, 576 (2004) (Scalia & Stevens, J., dissenting).
42 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The justices of Rules & Standards, 106 HARV. L. Rnv. 22 (1992).
43 Id. at 58.
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1. Bright Line Rules
The Supreme Court has created many constitutional bright lines. Loretto r.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation44 held that a city ordinance had
"taken" a landlord's property by requiring installation of cable facilities.
Although the "permanent physical invasion" of the building was trivial, the
government must compensate the owner.45 This bright line rule protects two of
the most important rights in real property's bundle of rights: exclusion 46 and
personal use.4 ' Future plaintiffs simply prove "permanent physical invasion,"
the occupation of their land for significant time. 48 There will be few evidentiary
or inferential problems (unlike determining if taking a gun into school
substantially impairs interstate commerce). It will be hard for future courts to
persuasively distinguish Loretto in similar situations, such as requiring property
owners to permit cellular phone towers without payment. Admittedly, there will
be squabbling at the margin over the meaning of the adjective "permanent," 4'
but the rule is quite predictable. Indeed, the Supreme Court has only applied
Loretto in one other case.5 Loretto should remain on the books. Holmes
observed that there is no better reason for a law than its resonating with deep
human instincts.51 People do not like other people putting things on their
property without permission. 52 Many years ago, many Americans destroyed
telephone poles put on their property when that new technology spread across
the land.53
The Court created another bright line in takings jurisprudence in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Counci/ 4 by holding that a State could not pass laws stripping a
44 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
45 Id. at 434-35.
46 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979); see also Int'lNews Ser." v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436.
48 Id. at 437-38.
49 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436 n.12. There has been some debate the meaning of "permanent."
Compare Hendler III, 952 F.2d at 1376 ('"[P]ermanent' does not mean forever, or anything like
it."), and Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (asserting
Heidler "merely meant to focus attention on the character of the government intrusion
necessary to find a permanent occupation, rather than solely focusing on temporal duration.")
5( See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003).
51 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. RET. 457, 477 (1897)
52 Property owner do not want cellular towers sited anywhere near their propert, See Steven J.
Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, InjTast, cture Security, and the NIMBY Problem, 54 CATH. U. L.
RET. 445 (2005).
53 Eula Bliss, The War on Telephone Poles, HARPER'S MAG., Feb. 2009 at 19. See also War on
Telephone Poles, N.Y. TIMLS, Feb. 6, 1889 at 1.
54 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
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piece of property of all value. When people buy land, it is a reasonably
foreseeable risk that the government may pass future laws diminishing the value
of their land (zoning is most obvious),55 but nobody would like to buy land
knowing that the government can legislate the land's value out of existence by
precluding any development. According to the Court, that extreme loss is
constitutionally unacceptable.5" Investors would pay less for real property
(particularly wetlands) if they knew the government could wipe them out.
Extreme cases cry for judicial intervention. Imagine the Army Corps of
Engineers building a dam that floods private property57 or a law precluding
owners from utilizing their land because the owners disturb an endangered
species: the owners would only retain title and tax liability. These bright line
rules create a bulwark against governmental bad faith, of confiscation via
regulation. Any future Court would be under great pressure to explain how and
why it chose to alter them. These cases show how bright line rules resist change
differently than factor tests, which require Courts to consider different variables
having little or no commensurability, or balancing tests that usually include a
conclusory adjective. 58 Thus, Justices can best embed their fears and aspirations
in such rigid rules. Because a bright line is harder to dilute or distinguish, an
unsympathetic majority must accept the rule and its applications, replace it with
a different doctrine, or overrule it. Unless a Court wants to disrupt massive
amounts of constitutional law, it will leave many of these workable rules alone.
2. Balancing Tests
It is hard to take Justice Scalia's dichotomy between rules and standards too
seriously, because he has frequently joined conservative majorities that replaced
bright lines with balancing tests, as in Lope.I and has sometimes created his own
pliable doctrine. In Nolan v. Cali/brnia Coastal Commission,5' he held that the
Commission acted unconstitutionally by requiring beachfront property owners
to provide public access to a beach before rebuilding their home. He claimed
that the "nexus" between the end (increased public access) and the means
(regulating home construction) was so tenuous that California had engaged in
'a plan of out-and-out extortion." ' There is no simple way to evaluate the "fit"
ends and means. It is even harder to determine when the government is
invoking a legitimate power as a "pretext" for an unconstitutional act, which in
this context consisted of "extortion." Courts determine the quality of the fit
55 See Pen,. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) .
56 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
51 This is exactly what occurred to propert owners in Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
58 See Forms of Doctine, supra note -, at 806, 819.
59 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
60 Id. at 837 (quotingJ.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584 (1981).
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between claimed ends and means by evaluating evidence, 1 relying upon
"common sense,"'6 2 assessing alternatives solutions, and predicting effects.
The Supreme Court infers bad intentions when it concludes governments have
gone "too far.",64 In addition, the doctrinal field of "unconstitutional
conditions" is remarkably resistant to grand theory.65 There is a legal consensus
on and off the Court that the government has more constitutional discretion
when determining how to spend its own money than when regulating others.6
But here, the government is imposing a condition on a private party without
providing any of its own money. Still, some of these conditions are acceptable;
States can require health, safety, aesthetic, and environmental building permits.
The problem is one of degree, not of kind, as reflected in Scalia's slippery
''nexus" test.
Justice Scalia joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's subsequent opinion, Dolan i. Ciy
o' Tigard, which added a balancing requirement to Scalia's inferential "nexus"
test.6 The City would not allow to a businesswoman to expand her store unless
she dedicated part of her undeveloped land to flood control and a public bike
path.68 The Chief Justice found that the conditions "fit" because dedicating land
to flood control limited flooding, unlike the situation in Nolan, where there was
no obvious relationship between rebuilding a home and public access to a
beach.69 But he asserted that there was a disproportionate relationship between
the impact of the future development on the environment and the impact of
the condition on the owner." "Proportionality" is another classic balancing
test.71 One tipping factor, as in Nolan, was the City's interference with the
plaintiffs right to exclude others, "one of the most essential sticks in the
61 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 392-96.
62 See.Johnson v. Calfornia, 321 F.3d 791, 801 (2003), rev'd, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
63 Cit of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 418 n.13 (1993).
64 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 ("While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized at a taking."); see a/so Vieth v. Jube/irer, 541 U.S. 267, 335 (2004)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen race is elevated to paramount status - when it is the be-all and
end-all of the redistricting process - the legislature has gone too far.").
65 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Impossible, 72 DEN. U. L. RII\. 1007 (1995) (characterizing the
development of a unifying theory for unconstitutional conditions as "impossible"); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1416 (1989) ("[T]he doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions is riven with inconsistencies.").
66 See Rust v. Su//ivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-95 (2000); Nationa/EndowmentforArt v. Finey, 524 U.S.
569, 571 (1998).
6 512 U.S. at 388-91.
68 Id. at 379-80.
69 Id. at 377-78.
70Id. at 394-96.
1 See K.G. Jan Pillai, Incongruent Disproportiona/i, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645 (2002).
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bundle of right," by demanding a public path.2 But no bright line was created."
Future Courts must compare the size and expense of the development with the
costs and benefits of legal requirements.
Nolan and Dolan present a future liberal Court with several choices: (1) Should
they jettison the doctrines either by overruling them or replacing them? (2)
Should they reverse the particular outcomes but limit the doctrines' future
impact? Or (3) Should they extend the reasoning to similar situations? The two
cases protect Loretto's core rights. It would be very troubling if a City could
"condition" a landlord's application for a building permit upon the builder's
allowing the government to invade the property with cable devices. At some
point, the government has gone "too far," unless one believes that the
government has unlimited power to condition permits. Although Dolan and
Nolan remain debatable-as the five-to-four opinions indicate-they provide
some guidance and constraints on governmental abuse. At the least, the Court
should be skeptical of efforts to force landowners to admit more people on
their property (whether along a beach or on a bike path). Also, the cases have
not spawned a massive amount of litigation strangling the government's ability
to regulate development. 4 How should these cases be applied in the future? It
is hard to say: it depends upon the particular condition.
These examples demonstrate how rules are both stronger and weaker than
balancing tests in terms of stare decisis. Rigid rules' strengths of clarity, ease of
application, predictability, and durability give future Justices less maneuvering
room, which eventually may provoke a judicial backlash. Almost ironically,
rules need the doctrine of stare decisis more than balancing tests. Balancing
tests bend but need not break,"5 while bright lines force future Justices into "all-
or-nothing" positions.
When Courts invalidate a rule, they need a doctrinal replacement. After all, they
have not just tossed out a rule, but also its existing and likely applications.
However, some of the situations covered by the existing rule might warrant
continuing protection. An inability to formulate better doctrine is another
reason to maintain the status quo. For instance, the Court usually creates a
bright line for a powerful reason it perceives the particular factual issue
exemplifies a "core right," "core interest," or "core power" that could and
72 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 393.
73 See Damon Christian Watson, Dolan and the 'Roagh Proporfionaity" Standard: Taking Its Tol on
Loretto's Bright Line: Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), 18 H \RX. J.L. & PUB,
POL'Y 591 (1995).
74 Cj .Carlos A. Ball & Lawie Reynolds, Exactions 6- Burden Distibution in Takings Law, 47 WNi. &
MARY L. REv. 1513, 1559-60 nn.219-221 (2006).
75 Sullivan, supra note -, at 66-67.
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should be easily and aggressively protected.6 Here, the Court is attempting to
protect the core property right of exclusion and prevent the classic
governmental abuse of confiscation. Bright lines prevent further incursion. To
the degree that many people instinctively believe the Court initially handled the
core example properly, it is harder for future Justices to reject the doctrine and
future applications. Thus, any liberals who want to get rid these four cases
should create alternative doctrine, which is likely to be more imprecise but still
prevents the injustices identified in those cases.
B. Formal Equaliy
When invalidating a state law levying a special operations tax on a national bank
in McCulloch v. Ma{yland," Chief Justice Marshall utilized numerous, enduring
constitutional arguments. The Court should deferentially assess the "necessity"
(the "fit") between Congress's chosen means, a national bank, and its
constitutionally authorized ends, which included financing the military.8 Courts
cannot easily determine the degree of "necessity."" 9 Marshall next all but
declared Maryland's tax to be pretextual, designed to destroy the national bank
instead of to raise revenue."' Marshall condemned the tax's focus on bank
operations.81 However, he conceded that the State retained power to tax federal
entities in the same fashion that it taxed its citizenry.82 In other words, States
could pass a generally applicable tax on wages or land that applied to the
national bank.83 Universality, by its very nature, reduces the likelihood of
legislative abuse; voters would not support representatives who pass punitive
taxes that apply to them as well an unpopular national bank.84 Furthermore, the
targeted bank was tempting; states could reap a profit. They would collect
revenues from citizens living outside Maryland, who had paid federal taxes
supporting national banks.85 There would be taxation without representation.6
76 See, e.g., RA.V.. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Our First
Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of
speech. Core political speech occupies the highest, most protected position.. .
77 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
8s Id. at 408-410, 421-423.
79 Id. at 421.
8
' Id. at 431.
81 Id. at 436-37.
82 Id. at 436.
13 Ultimately, the Court later concluded that federal employee salaries are not immune from
taxation by the states. See Graves P. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
84 MAcCu//och, 17 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 428.
15 Id. at 435.
116 Id. at 431.
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Marshall created workable doctrine of formal equality that simultaneously
authorized and limited governmental power. Formal equality is constitutionally
attractive for many reasons. Governments lose the presumption of
constitutionality when focusing on constitutionally-protected parties or
interests. Maryland had failed to create "common law," law common to all.
Also, formal equality often generates bright line rules, providing the benefits
and costs that come with such rules, particularly ease of enforcement. Such
rules make the Court appear more judicial: the higher the level of generality, the
greater the appearance of impartiality. Finally, formally equal rules are very
powerful. Some interest groups cannot overtly impose their unconstitutional
preferences. For example, Brown v. Board of Education's prohibition of racist
public school systems prevented the racist interest group from using this
despicable tool of oppression.
New York v. United States followed Marshall's approach. Justice O'Connor
invalidated a federal law targeting States by requiring them to take title to
undesirably expensive nuclear waste generated by private parties whenever
States refused to participate in the federal disposal program.88 At the same time,
she allowed Congress to pass formally neutral laws that equally burdened States
and private parties:89 Congress could prohibit States from discriminating on the
basis of age,9" disability,91 or race 92 and could impose broad environmental
laws. 93 Just as Marshall's opinion prevented Maryland from destroying the bank,
so New York made it much harder for Congress to evade administrative and
financial responsibilities by imposing unique obligations on the States and/or
requiring State officials (aside from State judges) to enforce laws they did not
make. If New York had gone the other way, corporations would have obtained
an attractive way to obtain state subsidies without the state voters'
participation. 94 The tactics were not just coercive, but also a usurpation of State
legislative power.95 Imagine a federal law requiring States to assume toxic bank
assets if they didn't implement a particular regulatory regime. Or even worse, a
81 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
s Id. at 149.
89 Id. at 160. Justice O'Connor cites several cases in which the Court had previously upheld
generally applicable laws, including Garia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authodly, 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
9( Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 621 - 634 (2006).
91 Americans with Disability Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. (2006).
92 See Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e etseq. (2006).
93 See, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. (2006); Clean Air Act of 1963, 42
U.S.C. § 7401 etseq. (2006).
94 Wilson, supra note -, at 1693-94.
95 New York, 505 U.S. at 176 (asserting that the federal action would "commandeer state
governments into the service of federal regulator purpose").
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federal law transferring private toxic private debts to the States. After New York,
the corporations and the States will form natural alliances against general
federal legislation. The "political safeguards of federalism" work much better
when the States have private power as an ally instead of a predator.
Formal equality does not solve all constitutional problems: it can exacerbate
underlying social problems that legislatures should be able to address. Moral
philosophers from Aristotle to Thomas Nagel have observed that most political
disputes can be framed in terms of competing conceptions of equality for
which there is no self-evident ranking. The Court usually can choose between
competing conceptions of formal equality, just as it can choose between
competing conceptions of "rights." Brown's prohibition of segregation was as
"formally equal" as P/esy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal" doctrine", the rule
that Brown explicitly overruled. Pl/essy arguably did not "discriminate" on the
basis of race because it required (in theory but not in practice)' that States
provide equal educational resources to all children. Some political analysts have
criticized formal equality's tendencies. In the Second Discourse, Rousseau did not
describe the formation of the social contract as an agreement among equals. 8
Rather, the rich and the poor were in such a state of perpetual conflict that the
rich gave up some of their power by implementing a system of formal equality,
a system that would calm the masses but would not destroy wealth and power."
The result, to paraphrase Anatole France, is that the rich and the poor have an
equal right to live in their car after foreclosure."" John C. Calhoun warned the
North that its formally equal tariffs discriminated against the South by driving
up the cost of imports and strengthening Northern manufacturing."" He
observed that the Constitution was not well designed to combat this
unconstitutional sectional economic warfare and that violence was likely.12
Lochner v. New York,"' another major case that the Court eventually overruled,"4
96 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
97 See ANTHONY LEWIS, PORTRAIT OF A DECADE: THE SECOND A1MERICAN REVOLUTION 20
(1964) (describing the disparity in 1915 where South Carolina spend $23.76 per white pupil and
only $2.91 on the average African-American child).
98 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Origin of Inequality (Trans. G.D.H. Cole, Cosimo 2006)
(1754).
99 Id. at 78-79.
1() See ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Trans. Winifred Stephens, John Lane 1910) ("The
law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in
the streets, and to steal bread.").
101 JOHN C. CAkLHOUN, SOUTH CAROLINA EXPOSITION AND PROTEST (1828) (decrying the
effect of the Tariff system in which "its burdens are exclusively on [the South] and its benefits
on [the North]).
102 Id.
103 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
104 Or at least implicitly overruled in Wiliamso, v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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constitutionalized the common law's formally equal rules of contract that
assume equality of bargaining power." 5 More recently, Derrick Bell and many
other liberals have challenged the claim that the Constitution must be
"colorblind," an aspiration found in Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy, because
that standard threatens affirmative action." 6 By ignoring a long history of legal,
cultural, and economic inequality, colorblindness perpetuates those injustices'
effects.1"
The affirmative action controversy is a classic example of interest group politics
being played out at the constitutional level. In an ideal world, the Constitution
should be completely "color blind," hostile to all laws using race as a category.
Nevertheless, affirmative action may be a necessary evil, justified by past
injustices and future necessities (such as having a fully integrated officer corps
to effectively lead our troops), but it will always remain under a constitutional
cloud due to its incompatibility with the more universal norm. So what should
be done about the Supreme Court's current affirmative action doctrine, which
has virtually eliminated the tool except for higher education in Bakke?" 8 Future
progressives will be tempted to permit States and the federal government to use
affirmative action in hiring, firing, and contracting at all levels, but that judicial
counterattack will alienate many citizens. Thus, liberal Justices should seriously
consider retaining Parents Invo/ved in Communiy Schools v. Seattle School District,
which struck down plans to desegregate public schools by considering race,
because that case did not involve higher education." 9 Conversely, conservatives
should be wary of overruling Bakke, which could encourage Hispanic voters to
support the Democratic Party. The divisive issue should be left in its awkward
doctrinal limbo. The current doctrine provides access for many of the most
gifted members of all racial groups, diffuses racial tensions, and facilitates
diversity within the military, the academy, business, and politics.1"
1(5 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legaty, 87 COLUM. L. RI\v. 873, 882 (1987).
t06 Derrick A. Bell, Race, Racism, and American Law 115-135 (5th Ed. 2004)
t07 Id. at 126 35.
1(18 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
109 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
"') These institutions passionately supported University of Michigan's affirmative action policy
in Grwtter '. Boliniger; 539 U.S. 306 (2003). See Brief of the Society of American Law Teachers as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents (Feb. 19, 2003), 2003 WL 399060; Brief of the
Association of American ledical Colleges, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents
(Feb. 14, 2003), 2003 WL 398338; Brief for Graduate Management Admission Council and the
Executive Leadership Council as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents (Feb. 14, 2003), 2003
WL 399157.
(2011) J. JuRs 343
HeinOnline  -- 10 J. Juris 343 2011
THE JOURNAL JURISPRUDEN(CE
C. Subsequent liti gation
Hindsight makes the stare decisis inquiry somewhat easier than the process of
making the original decision. Future courts can evaluate how the legal system
has applied existing law and the doctrines' social consequences. There are at
least four ways to use subsequent litigation to measure doctrinal strength: (1)
Does the rule generate numerous cases? (2) Are the later disputes over
application of the rule to new facts?; (3) Is the Supreme Court itself still
disputing the wording of the rule? (4) Is the scope of the rule growing,
shrinking, or relatively stable?
1. Abandoned Doctrine
The absence of additional cases may indicate that a doctrine has been
"abandoned." 111 Or, it can indicate success. In Casey, the plurality would not
give "zombie doctrines" stare decisis protection.1 12 It is not easy to diagnose
abandonment. For instance, in the past few decades, the Supreme Court has
only held twice that States have unconstitutionally impaired contracts between
private parties. 113 In Allied StructuralSteel v. Spannaus,1 14 the Court concluded that
the State could not impose "severe" new pension obligations upon a
Corporation for a group of workers who had previously worked for the
company for ten years. Writing for a five Justice majority in a five-to-three case,
Justice Stewart assessed the law for its "reasonableness" and "necessity." '115 This
case could have revived laissez-faire constitutionalism."' However, two
subsequent decisions11 indicated that the Court was not going to apply
Spannaus vigorously; as a result, the case is currently a footnote in most
constitutional law textbooks, a bit of a constitutional sport, significantly limited
to its facts and factors. Although not directly on point because it involved the
federal government, Pension Benefit Guarany Cop. v. R-A. Gray & Co."8
emphasized retroactivity as the most important constitutional variable.
111 "The doctrine of stare decisis is at its nadir when the rule in question has been effectively
abandoned by the erosion of time, rendering its rationale obsolete." Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.
112 Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.
113 See Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)
114 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
115 Id. at 242, 247.
116 Richard Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contracts Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703 (1984).
117 Exxon Cop. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983) (restricting Spannaus' application to statutes
whose "sole effect was to alter contractual duties"); Keystone Bituminous CoalAss ' v. DeBeni, 480
U.S. 470 (1987).
118 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
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Despite their narrow scope and their potential for future disruption, these two
cases should be retained. There is a general presumption against retroactivity in
the Constitution,"' a presumption that serves many of the same purposes as
statutes of limitations.12 Private parties should not be penalized for legal
activity. They relied upon existing law and the risks associated with changes in
future laws to determine what to do. 121 Retroactive legislation is often a tool of
tyranny. Judging from the subsequent litigation history, these cases have not
spawned serious impediments to regulation of business,122 while possibly
deterring governments from passing oppressively retroactive laws. Of course,
that deterrent benefit (assuming it is a benefit) is impossible to measure.
Advocates of Spannaus will claim the lack of litigation demonstrates the
doctrine's popularity and effectiveness, while opponents will dismiss the case as
trivial and/or dangerous. Finally, liberals who fear a cataclysmic revival of
Lochner-like jurisprudence from such cases should be less concerned if their
representatives control a future Court.
2. Ensuing Litigation
Malleable factor and balancing tests tend to generate the most subsequent
litigation. 123 There will be arguments over applications of the standard(s)
and/or over the terms of the test. In National League of Cities v. Use, 124 then
Justice Rehnquist created a multiple factor balancing test to determine when
Congress could regulate the "State as State." 125 Congress could not interfere
with "integral governmental functions, 126 that States have "traditionally
afforded their citizens,"' 12' because that would impair the State's "ability to
119 The Constitution explicitly proscribes ex post facto laws, See U.S. Cons. art. 1, 9, cl. 3. This
presumption against retroactivity is further enshrined in the Contract Clause of Art. 1, §10, the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause and in the fair notice mandates of the Due Process Clause.
Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994).
120 See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. RE v.457, 477 (1897).
121 See United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 19 n.17 ("[C]ontracting parties adopt the terms of their
bargain in reliance on the law in effect at the time the agreement is reached"); Spannaus, 438
U.S. at 245.
122 See G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Court, 81 CAL. L. RVii. 433, 436.
123 While there is an absence of empirical studies on the matter, many scholars support this
supposition. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zyvwicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic
Analysis of Tradition's Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 409, 495 n.368 (1999);
Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and Sophisticated Users: Encouraging the Use of Intermediaries
to TransmitProductSat), Information, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1185, 1236 (1996).
124 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
125 Id. at 842, 854.
126 ld. at 855.
12 Id. at 851.
(2011) J. JURIS 345
HeinOnline  -- 10 J. Juris 345 2011
TIE JoURN AI JURISPRUDENCE
function," 12  particularly when Congress displaces the States' freedom to
"structure integral operations., 129 States then challenged numerous federal laws
and regulations. The lower courts tried to determine if States were engaging in a
"traditional" function.13 Things did not get any clearer after Justice Marshall
subsequently added another obscure criterion: Congress had to threaten an
"attribute" of State sovereignty.131 Notice how it is easier for the Court to add
or delete a factor from factor tests than to formally repudiate the doctrine."'
After a few years, the lower courts generated such a hodge-podge of outcomes
that Justice Blackmun, who had originally concurred in Usegy, overturned Usegy
in Garia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Tranit Authoriy.'33 He believed the resulting
doctrinal chaos demonstrated that the Court could not create judicially
manageable standards to protect the States. New York v. United States would be
the first of several cases proving him wrong; conservatives found more
workable doctrine.
Constitutional doctrine may evolve from a dynamic, indeterminate balancing
test into a narrow, rigid rule designed to preclude future growth. For example,
after advocates for the poor convinced a majority to require states to waive
court fees in divorce cases in Boddie v. Connecticui 3 , a future conservative
majority, in Kras v. United States, limited Boddie to its facts. 13 5 The Justices
concluded that divorce, unlike bankruptcy, is a unique civil law remedy and is
an aspect of the right to marry, which is protected by substantive due
process. 36 Kras was one of many cases eradicating the hope that the Supreme
Court would create many positive rights assisting the indigent. 3 There was one
later exception: a bare majority held that children of illegal immigrants had a
right to minimal, equal public education. 138 But the other cases did not extend
128 Id. at 852 (quoting Fl9' v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975).
129 Id.
130 The lack of coherence and determinacy in District Courts precipitated Useg"s eventual
reversal. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1985) (collecting
cases).
131 Hodel v. Virg. Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981).
132 Conservatives have attempted to eliminate "divisiveness" from the Lemon test in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Lynch P. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). Justice
Breyer recently revived the doctrine. See Van Orden v. Peny, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
t33 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
t34 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
135 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
136 Id. at 443 45.
137 See, e.g., Dandiddge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (welfare); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56 (1972) (housing); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodigue 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (equal
funding of education).
138 Py/erv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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the educational right to require either free textbooks13 9or transportation.14 This
is one of the saddest areas of constitutional law. The nation's treatment of the
poor and the working class (and now, more and more of the middle class) has
been deplorable. Yet, the Court cannot easily use constitutional law to solve
most problems in our political economy, much less the basic question of
distributive justice. Keynes, Milton Friedman, or Herbert Spencer ought not to
play a major role in constitutional adjudication. Unelected judges should not
direct economies or wage wars; they do not have the "power of the purse" and
"the power of the sword." Equally disturbing, the Court takes a core power
from Congress by increasing expenditures without representation. Such moves
entangle the Court in partisan politics and inevitably generate peculiar results,
such as Lochner's permitting States to regulate miners' hours but not bakers'
hours. What do unelected lawyers know about physical labor? Finally, State
Court intervention has not been very effective: the Ohio Supreme Court found
a state school funding plan to be unconstitutional in 1997,141 but that decision,
much heralded at the time, has sporadically influenced subsequent allocation of
educational resources.142 What, ultimately, can the Ohio Supreme Court do?
Hold the legislators in contempt if they fail to implement a particular funding
scheme that the Court divined out of general constitutional text?
Justices face a dilemma that perpetually undermines their attempt to create
enduring constitutional law. To justify any opinion, they must provide reasons
and supporting facts. Yet every reason can become a requirement, and every
fact can limit a decision's impact. Rehnquist's reasons in Usegy became factors
in subsequent cases, eventually leading to doctrinal chaos (according to Justice
Blackmun). More recently, Justice O'Connor held that the Ohio could create a
voucher system in the dysfunctional Cleveland public school system, partially
because a pre-existing charter school system provided parents and students
with many options. Are such facts constitutional perquisites, or can healthy
school districts, which provide no alternatives, also use vouchers? In a similar
fashion, Chief Justice Roberts refused to permit a city to use race to allocate
students for integration purposes, noting that the program had not been used
very often. Would this observation make a heavily utilized program
constitutional? Fact-rich and reason-rich opinions resemble balancing tests,
providing future Courts with alternative ways to distinguish or limit their
authority without formally overruling them.
139 arnes P. Kentucky, 538 F.2d 328 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977).
14( Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
141 DeRoiph v. Ohio, 678 N.E.2d 866 (Ohio 1997).
142 See Shadya Yazback, Note, School Financing in Ohio Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow:
Searching for a "Thorough and Efficient" System of Public Schools, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
671 (2007).
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III. Normative, Adhesive Factors
There are several normative reasons why most lawyers and Justices believe stare
decisis is an important constitutional consideration. The doctrine promotes
"the rule of law," stabilizes the culture, and contains the norm of temporal
equality
. 
But is worth remembering that stare decisis does not carry as much
weight in constitutional cases as in statutory cases, because, except for in a few
rare situations such as issues involving the "dormant commerce clause," only
the Court can change its doctrine (except through the cumbersome amendment
process).
A. Enhancing 'The Rule oj'Law"
Until now, this article has have emphasized the "internals" of a doctrine,
objective factors gleaned from the face of judicial opinions. It is time to address
the underlying normative questions that have been somewhat begged: why take
stare decisis seriously, especially when it compromises one's preferred
conception of rights that also should be taken seriously? Perhaps Justices
should quickly change constitutional law. If I agree with John Rawls that every
citizen should obtain basic necessities, what not constitutionalize that right?
143
In addition, stare decisis requires a Justice to discard Ronald Dworkin's vividly
inspiring, but flawed metaphor of "rights as trumps. '144 If rights are trumps,
then the lowliest right (which could be the constitutional equivalent of the "two
of clubs" in terms of value) must prevail over all other interests (unless we
consider some of those competing governmental concerns to be higher trumps,
which ruins the analogy) .145 Even if one has a constitutional right to bear arms
and to one's property, it does not follow that one has a right to a Stinger Missile
or to raise pigs in a suburban backyard. Not every component in property's
"bundle of rights" deserves unlimited constitutional protection.
The most important counterargument to rapid constitutional change is that
stare decisis promotes the "rule of law., 146 Justice Roberts emphasized this
theme in his concurrence in Citizens United. Although some believe think the
143 This point is essentially captured in Rawls' "difference principle," which ensures access to
necessities. SeeJohn Rawls, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 137-40 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (1971).
144 Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 152, 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press) (1984) ("[R]ights are best understood as trumps over some background
justification for political decisions that states a goal for the community as a whole").
145 For a recent critique of the "trumps" metaphor, see Richard H. Pildes, Whj Rights Are 1Not
Trumps: Sodal Meanings, Expressive Harms and Constitutional/ism, 27 J. LE GAL STUD. 725 (1998).
146 See Roscoe Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDmIM L. REV. 1, 5 (1941) ("Some
conception of stare decisis is vital to the concept of limited government and the rule of law by
restricting judicial 'absolutism."'); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judical Restraint, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 288 (1990).
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notion of "the rule of law" is silly, vacuous, or misleading propaganda,14 it is a
vital adhesive.148 The incomparable philosopher David Hume observed that the
greatest human failing is our tendency to think short term.14' Relying upon
force and persuasion, the legal system is the primary social institution for
imposing a broader, lengthier perspective."" Not only does it punish many
forms of instant gratification (such as murder, fraud, or certain forms of drug
addiction), but it also creates a cadre of professionals who benefit from
enforcing the society's perceived long-term values. Aristotle refuted Plato's
ideal of a static legal culture.151 We do not want a static legal system that is
unresponsive to change and correction, but we also should fear an overly fluid
system that disorients the citizenry and undermines the habit of legal
obedience."' Just as the Court ought to apply a presumption of
constitutionality to every law, every citizen should presumptively obey every
legal mandate. In other words, stare decisis creates a "habit of obedience" for
Justices.
Constitutional law plays an unusually large role in American law, politics, and
culture for several reasons. The Constitution is the populace's primary symbolic
source of allegiance, their legal Grundnorm.53 The Constitution also provides a
collection of "secondary rules" establishing basic rule-generating and rule-
enforcing procedures and institutions.1 54 Finally, the Supreme Court has applied
the Constitution to a vast range of issues. But our country is not just run by an
elite group of lawyers. Because there is an enduring tension between the
electoral many and the judicial few, a whiff of illegitimacy lingers around every
Supreme Court finding of unconstitutionality: why should five unelected, highly
successful lawyers tell the rest of us what we can and cannot do in a country
147 Felix Cohen disparaged "rules of law" as legal concepts within a "special branch of the
science of transcendental nonsense." Transcendental Nosese aud the Functional Approach, 35
CoLuM. L. REv. 809, 821 (1935).
148 See genera/l BRIAN Z. TA\L- NAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY
(2004); Brian Z. Tamanaha, How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL
L. RizV. 469 (2007).
149 DAVID Hu\fLE, A TREATISE OF HUI\AN NATURE 481 (BiblioBazaar 2007) (1739-40).
150 Id. at 481-83.
151 "Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered ...
Hence we infer that sometimes and in certain cases laws may be changed. ARTISTOLE,
POLITICS, Book II, Part VIII.
152 Id. ("For the habit of lightly changing the laws is an evil, and, when the advantage is small,
some errors both of lawgivers and rulers had better be left; the citizen will not gain so much by
making the change as he will lose by the habit of disobedience."); see also THOMA.S AQUINAS,
SUMM\L THEOLOGICA, Question 97 "Of Change in Laws" (1274).
153 See genera/l, HANS KE LSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF THE LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg
trans., Harvard Univ. Press) (1945).
154 For example, Art. 1, 9, cl. 2 specifies the procedure by which a bill becomes law.
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that is allegedly "democratic?" Efforts to distinguish the Court's actions as
"legal" instead of "political" or "principled" rather than "policy driven" fail
because all judicial determinations require some "political" viewpoint that first
determines a law's purposes and next predicts how alternative choices of action
may facilitate those ends.155 Every "principle" is ultimately justified by its value
to the polity. The Justices need to persuade a large percentage of us that they
are properly exercising (or refusing to exercise) their coercive powers.156
Fortunately for the Court, it need not rely on persuasion alone: the outcome,
backed by force, is at least as important. Once the police enforce a particular
doctrine, it gains some authority through acquiescence and habit. Lawyers
master the Panglossian art of turning the "real" into the "reasonable."
The written opinion forces the Court to be somewhat transparent. The Court
must present reasons and outcomes that are acceptable to a significant degree
of the public (most cases, of course, are primarily of professional interest).15
That process limits judicial discretion/activism to an important degree: no
Justice would write today that Brown v. Board of Education should be overruled
because African-Americans are innately inferior. Stare decisis constrains the
Court by requiring it to explain how its recent results coexist with its past.158 It
is a major part of the common law method that requires a Justice to assess a
problem from several different perspectives before reaching a final
conclusion.15' The Justice revisits initial, intuitive reactions several times before
making a final determination. When the Court avoids this discipline, it
undermines the persuasive strength of not only the particular opinion, but also
the Court itself. For instance-to use a "liberal" victory for a change-Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Romer v. Evans"' was bewildering partially because he
made no effort to explain why homosexuals deserved constitutional protection
155 This article disagrees with the claim that "precedent rarely influences" the decisions of
Supreme Court justices. See HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR
MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRE CEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT 287 (1999).
156 The Court's institutional legitimacy is considerably more robust than some of its decisions,
see Richard H. Fallon, Legitimao' and the Constitution, 118 HARIT . L. RENT. 1787 (2005)
157 See Martin Shapiro, Law and Politics in the Supreme Court: New Approaches to Political
Jurisprudence 29 (1964).
158 Accordingly, stare decisis is arguably a better instrument for facilitating judicial restraint than
conservative ideologies such as originalism. See Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Deisis and
the Promotion ofJudicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271 (2005).
159 Cf Richard B. Cappalli, At the Point of Decision: The Common Law's Advantage Over Civil Law, 12
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 87 (1998); see also Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59
HARV . L. RVIT. 376 (1946).
160 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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after an earlier Court had held that States could criminalize homosexual
behavior in Bowers i. Hardwick. 
16
B. Maintaining Social, Political, and Legal Stabiliy
Stare decisis is an inherently conservative doctrine.6 2 The values of legal
stability and obedience are particularly important in this country. It borders on
using intellectual clich6s to point out that the Constitution and the legal system
play crucial roles in unifying American society, and that the people of the
United States do not a common heritage. Perpetual immigration is one of the
nation's defining characteristics.6 3 Americans live under an abstract system self-
consciously created by a few extraordinary statesmen instead of under a State
that emerged out of (or was imposed upon) a culture existing for over a
thousand years. Indeed, they have a notoriously bad historical memory, which
is a curse (due to resulting ignorance and stupidity) and a blessing (because
historical grudges tend to fade more quickly than elsewhere). 6 4 Consequently,
Americans across the political spectrum have a powerful interest in maintaining
their belief in the "rule of law," even if that belief is somewhat fanciful, even
mythological." 5
Stare decisis serves this goal by reducing the Court's visibility (if the Court does
not change existing law, fewer people notice). It requires the Court to engage in
legal craftwork that simultaneously obscures and clarifies its reasoning, keeping
many potentially divisive issues out of sight and thus out of mind.1 The Court
should not dramatically change its law after every election and every new
appointment, avoiding the impression that constitutional law is just another
form of partisan politics.
161 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The striking absence of a citation to Bowers in Justice Kennedy's
opinion has been highlighted by virtually ever scholar dissecting the Romer decision. See, e.g.,
Lynn A. Baker, The Missing Pages of the Majorit Opinion in Romer v. Evans, 68 U. COLO. L. RLI.
387, 389 (1997).
162 Craig Haney, P'cholog and Legal Change: On the Limits of a Factual jurisprudence, 4 LAW & HUM.
BEHAI. 147, 159-60 (1980).
163 See generalj' Roger Daniels, Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in
American Life (Harper Perennial) (2002).
164 A fundamental question is whether this epoch of relative calm in American politics is
coming to an end.
165 See PAUL L. IKAHN, American Exceptionalism, Popular Sovereignf, and the Rule of Law, in
AMERICAN EXMEPTIONALISM AND HUMLN RIGHTS 198, 198 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005)
(arguing that the Constitution "produces the absolute bedrock of the American political myth:
the rule of law is the rule of the people").
166 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAN. L. RE\ . 786,
811 (1967).
(2011) J. JURIs 351
HeinOnline  -- 10 J. Juris 351 2011
THE JOURNALJURISPRUDEN/;E
1. Distinguishing the Facts
A strong commitment to stare decisis reduces the overall stakes. It also puts
pressure on the Court to make less disruptive compromises. Both Chief Justice
Roberts' and Justice Alito's Senate confirmation hearings contained a great deal
of discussion about the role of stare decisis; the two jurists reassured the nation
that it would not see a new Constitution over the next few years.1" So far, with
the notable exception of Citizens United, they have not engaged in the radical
transformation that Justice Thomas seeks."6 8
The two new Justices demonstrated the value of stare decisis and the art of
judicial distinction-making in the almost ludicrous case, Morse v. Frederick.1"' A
high school suspended a student for displaying a large banner on which he had
written "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" while students gathered outside the school to
observe the running of the Olympic Torch.'" The Justices were unsure what
the banner meant. Although it is always difficult to determine Stoners'
Intentions, one plausible interpretation is that a group of high school students
were smoking marijuana when one of them observed that their pipe-passing
was a sacrament, similar to communion.1"1 Surrounded by Christian
Fundamentalists who had significantly different viewpoints about almost
everything, they thought it would be funny to claim they were getting high on
behalf of Jesus. This plausible interpretation complicates the issue. On the one
hand, it supports the majority's belief that the banner was advocating the use of
illegal drugs and wasn't pure gibberish.1" On the other, it suggests that the
167 In the context of the Court's abortion jurisprudence, Roberts responded that "'a precedent
of the court, like any other precedent of the court, [is] entitled to respect under principles of
stare decisis."' See Robin Toner, Court in Transition: Abortion; In Complex Dance, Roberts Pays Tribute
to Years of Precedent Behind Roe v. Wade, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at A24. Justice Alito paid
similar homage to the doctrine of stare decisis, proclaiming it to be "a very important doctrine"
that is "a fundamental part of our legal system." Court in Transition, 'When a Precedent Is Reaffirmed,
That Strengthens the Precedent', N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 2006, at A26.
168 Justice Scalia has been quoted as saying that Justice Thomas "doesn't believe in stare decisis,
period" and "if a constitutional line of authority is wrong, he would say 'let's get it right."' See
KEN FOSKETT, JUDGIN(, THOMAS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CLARENCE THOM\LS 281-82
(2004). Nevertheless, Justice Thomas does apply the doctrine of stare decisis where it is
presumably inopportune or imprudent to question longstanding Court doctrine. See Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
169 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
170 Id. at 2622.
171 The entheogenic use of marijuana has ancient origins. See Ernest L. Abel, Maruana - The
First Twelve-Thousand Years (1980), available at
http: //www.druglibrary.org/ schaffer /hemp /history/ first12000 /abel.htm.
172 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625.
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students may also have been punished for blasphemy, an unconstitutional form
of "viewpoint discrimination."
Rather than limiting himself to ancient constitutional history, Chief Justice
Roberts cited evidence showing the damaging effects of illegal drugs on young
people. 173 He argued that the high school had a legitimate interest in preventing
students from displaying pro-drug symbols. This makes sense: high school
students should not wear shirts to school endorsing various illegal vices or even
glorifying such legal vices as drinking, smoking, and gambling. There is no total
suppression: they can change clothes once they leave. Roberts distinguished the
case from Tinker, 1 4 which had protected a student's right to wear a black
armband to school to protest the Viet Nam War, because political debate over
decisions to go to war should be part of one's education, unlike the advocacy of
illegal drugs.1  Of course, this distinction is crudely circular, because advocacy
of illegal drug usage all but explicitly includes the political message of
legalization.
Nevertheless, many high school parents want their children to think about
when this nation should fight abroad, but far fewer wish for their children to be
surrounded at school by peers celebrating the consumption of illegal
substances. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas wanted to overrule Tinker,
asserting that public high schools could impose whatever constraints on speech
they wish. 176 Roberts's scalpel is preferable to Thomas's sledgehammer. High
schools should be a place of intellectual and political diversity. We don't want
public school officials to have the power to impose total orthodoxy. There have
been very few examples of disruption caused by students wearing campaign
buttons177 or crosses to school. Students benefit from exposure to and
expression of different political and religious viewpoints. But there is an
immediate cost if many children feel peer pressure, seemingly tolerated by the
authorities, to experiment with drugs that range from problematic to fatal.
Some forms of viewpoint discrimination are permissible in high school17 (very
few liberals would argue that public schools should not promote such norms as
diversity, decency, and environmentalism).
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628.
17 Ti,,ker v. Des Moines I, depeide t Comuity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
t75Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
t76 127 S. Ct. at 2633 35.
177 Cf Chandler v. McMinnv/lle Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 530 (91 Cir. 1992) (holding that student
buttons containing the pejorative word "scab" were not inherently disruptive).
t78 Even the dissent in Morse concedes this contention; "[I]t might well be appropriate to
tolerate some targeted viewpoint discrimination in this unique setting." 127 S. Ct. at 2646
(Stevens, J., dissenting)..
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2. Constitutional Prudence
Stare decisis diminishes the likelihood of rapid intellectual revolutions sweeping
through the Court. Linked to the past by doctrine and habit, Justices learn a
degree of judicial humility ,19 a trait these powerful, unelected officials with
lifetime tenure desperately need. Not only should they defer somewhat to "the
Framers" and "the People" who originally created the Constitutional text, but
they also should respect the prior adjudicators who wrestled with the same
issues. First impressions and reactions are often the best. The great
conservative theorists Edmund Burke and Michael Oakeshott feared the
dangers of excessive rationalism, a blend of excessive confidence in one's
particular ideology, indifference to the existing culture, and elevation of abstract
theory over facts and history.18 Many modern conservatives have been as guilty
of such intellectual hubris as the liberals on the Warren Court-one need only
contemplate the baneful effects of market fundamentalism, 181rigid Originalism,
a conception of the "unitary Executive" elevating the Presidency above the
law, 18 2 and permissive antitrust doctrine that helps create and protect massive
corporations which then become "too powerful to fail." '183 While intellectual
fads have more endurance than the average person's pursuit of pleasure, they
often are transient forces, products of intellectual arrogance and economic
interests. One decade, Milton Friedman's belief in the wisdom of market
equilibrium frames the debate, while the next era may prefer John Maynard
Keynes' embrace of uncertainty and wealth redistribution. It is risky when
doctrinaire movements grab effective control of the economy and the political
process, much less when they gain enduring influence through the less flexible,
less democratic process of constitutional adjudication. When most people
obtain power, they often believe the world has suddenly become a much better
and saner place. They perceive a mandate to implement most of their views.
184
Thomas Aquinas explained that rulers must be prudent, not trying to change
179 See Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REVI. 1173, 1178
(2006).
18() This is what Burke describes as the "abuse of reason." See EDM1\UND BURKE, A
VINDICATION OF NATURAL SOCIETY (Liberty Fund Inc. 1982) (1757); see also EDMUND BuRKE,
REFLECTIONS ON THE REV OLUTION IN FRANCE passim (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1790);
MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER EssAYs (Liberty Fund Inc.
1991) (1962). Stare decisis is very Burkean-asserting the need for continuity, humility, and
respect for the past at the expense of abstract theory.
181 See, e.g., Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962); Friedrich Hayek, Individualism
and Economic Order (1948).
182 See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The StruIctural Constitution: Unitag Executie, Plural
Judicia,, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992).
183 See Adam Nguyan & Matt Watkins, Financial Serices Reform, 37 HAR\ . J. ON LE(;IS. 579, 590
(2000).
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habits too quickly.185 For example, it would be a cultural and legal disaster to
outlaw cigarettes, despite their obvious dangers and the venality of their
purveyors.
Liberals are equally attracted to the dangerous charms of philosophical
consistency. The Supreme Court might have blundered if it had forced busing
into Detroit suburbs to address segregation in the City. 18 The majority's
arguments may not have been the best: 8 what "principled" distinction can be
drawn between Milliken's protection of the suburbs and an earlier opinion
finding pervasive discrimination within a school district based due to limited
discrimination within the district? 88 Everyone knows that the suburbs, agents
of the State, were zoned to keep out undesirables. 189 State-designed systems of
multiple municipalities facilitated and perpetuated segregation and undermined
integration. But blasting apart the suburbs may have done more harm than
good to race relations and the gradual emancipation of African-Americans:
black middle class flight soon followed white flight.
190
There is an understandable and justifiable tendency for liberals on and off the
Court to take a great deal of credit for President Obama's remarkable electoral
achievement; but it is likely that the conservatives' restraining hand also
contributed to his victory by blunting the liberals' understandable desire to
aggressively achieve racial justice. Although it is arguably too late for the Courts
to dramatically improve race relations through constitutional law, plaintiffs
should have focused on quality and/or "equal" neighborhood schools rather
than busing. Admittedly, that doctrine would have turned the Courts into
virtual school boards, but it arguably would have been warranted in light of the
nature and extent of the underlying constitutional injustice.
Justice Frankfurter and Judge Learned Hand criticized excessive judicial
review. 191 If elite lawyers resolve most important, divisive issues, the polity
becomes passive. In addition, extensive judicial review distorts the electorate's
decision-making, enabling factions to combine into oddly shaped political
185 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMIATHEOLOGI/;A, Question 97 "Of Change in Laws" (1274).
186 Mil/iken v. Bradey, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
18 See Robert L. Carter, Pubic School Desegregation: A Contemporaty Aallsis, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J.
885, 890 (1993).
1," Keyes v. SchoolDistict, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
1'9 See, e.g., Clement E. Vose, Caucasians Only: the Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the
Restrictive Covenant Cases 1-28 (1967).
19( See generally Mary Jo Wiggins, Race, Class, and Suburbia: The Modern Black Suburb as a
'Race-Making Situation,' 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 749 (2002).
191 See W. Va. State Bd. ofJEduc v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 668 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
see also LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (1958).
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parties. The Warren Court's enthusiastic protection of many constitutional
rights enabled libertarians and social conservatives to combine within the
Republican Party; libertarians did not have to worry about a significant loss of
individual rights so long as the Court remained somewhat "liberal." Judicial
deference forces Americans to confront serious problems. The Court may have
injured the Democratic Party permitting some affirmative action, thereby
alienating many white voters, but at least the electorate has the last word in
terms of higher education.192
C. TemporalEqualiy
Stare decisis promotes "fairness." '193 Conservative Justices did not jettison most
of the Warren Court's jurisprudence: they embraced cases like Brown and
Brandenburg " and extended the Warren Court's egalitarianism to gender
equality' and, to a lesser degree, gay rights.' Consistency is an often
overlooked egalitarian norm, which we can call "temporal equality." Liberals
perceive themselves as more committed to equality than their political rivals-
stare decisis reminds everyone that there is a presumptive fairness in deciding
similar cases in similar ways over relatively long periods of time. The Supreme
Court can ignore or repudiate any doctrine under the "changed circumstances"
test, but it should not employ that tool frequently.1 ' After all, many problems
have not changed: the struggle between the few and the many, man's
inhumanity to man, the need for safety, the destruction of the environment,
and the value of self-expression Oust to name a few of the values and conflicts
that have absorbed humans for thousands of years). Citizens feel particularly
degraded when they are informed that they have lost rights or powers after
relying upon a prior decision because new Justices believe times have
changed.198 Finally, and more prosaically, constitutional stability reduces
192 Daniel Patrick Tokaji, Note, The Persistence of Prejudice: Process- Based Theog and the
Retroaactivi,' of the CivilRights Act of 1991, 103 YALE L.J. 567, 584-86.
193 The notion that the Court should not discard precedent merely because of changes in
personnel has been described as an "argument from fairness." See Frederick Schauer, Precedent,
39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595-97 (1987).
194 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
195 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (settling on intermediate scrutiny for gender
classifications).
196 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
19 See State OilCo. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (" [S]tare decisis is not an inexorable command
... there is a competing interest, well represented in this Court's decisions, in recognizing and
adapting to changed circumstances.") (citations omitted).
198 C. Monaghan, supra note -, at 749-50 ("Expectations, tangible and symbolic, have
developed around the critical decisions; massive destabilization following a successful attack on
any of these would threaten the functioning of the federal government, if not the viability of
the constitutional order itself.").
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transaction costs.19' Lawyers, potential litigants, governmental officials, and
lower courts can rely upon existing doctrine...
Despite its many values, Stare decisis is just one of several constitutional
variables. Most of us acknowledge the need for flexibility and adaptability)" If
the Court followed Plato and never changed prior doctrine, the country would
be strangled by rules that few people would support. When the Justices took
their judicial oath, they vowed to support the Constitution, not the Court's
prior opinions.202 Prior adjudications are constitutional derivatives, worthy of
limited deference. Ultimately, stare decisis should not be taken too seriously.
IV. Normative, Divisive Factors
The prior descriptive and normative factors are always part of the stare decisis
calculation, but they often are dwarfed by competing ideological considerations
triggered by a particular issue. While the legal profession constantly argues
about proper modes of interpretation (whether and how to use text, history,
structure, purpose, and so forth) and applications of those modes to particular
texts and fact patterns, political passion underlies abstract arguments and
frequently arcane historical interpretations.
A. Controversy and Importance
Justices never overturn a decision simply because of the vote count. Nor do
they always uphold cases to create stability and foster obedience. At best, those
considerations intimate that the Justices should only overrule "dreadful" cases,
those that are perceived by many people (lawyers, academics, politicians, and, in
major cases, the laity) to be unacceptable. Preferably, with major cases, the
critics should represent many political perspectives, not just a narrow group of
party activists and intelligentsia.
No Court explored the role of stare decisis with more directly than the plurality
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennylvania v. Cas. 2 '3 The three Justices
refused to overrule a woman's "core right" to have an abortion during the
earlier stages of pregnancy, because that right was the "essential holding" of the
199 Farber, supra note -, at 1177.
200 Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 93, 102 (1989).
201 Hence, Justice Brandeis famous admonition that "[s]tare decisis is not . . . a universal
inexorable command." Burnett v. Colorado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
202 See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006).
203 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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incredibly controversial Roe v. Wade.204 They listed the normal stare decisis
considerations-- practical workability, reliance, consequences, abandoned
doctrine, and changes in either the facts or the interpretation of the facts
205
but next emphasized that some cases are special, because the Court had
"responded to national controversies.",26 ' The Justices found two analogues to
the abortion controversy in the Twentieth Century: the Supreme Court's
repudiation of Lochner v. New York's applying substantive due process to
economic regulation and Brown's invalidation of P/essy v. Ferguson's "separate but
equal" public school systems.
201
There is no self-evident way to ascertain which cases fall within this category;
each Justice must calibrate the importance of the issue and the degree of public
reaction. But the Casey plurality undoubtedly reviewed three deeply divisive,
important issues that bedevil the nation: the appropriate degree of economic
regulation, race relations, and family structures. The plurality explained that it
had reconfigured economic and racial constitutional law because "society" had
a newer and better "understanding of the facts."' 201 Somehow, the Court
became "society." Although that move seems presumptuous, it is necessary
whenever the Court revisits its most important holdings. The Court is more
justified in invoking "society" when it reduces judicial review, as in Lochner, than
when it second-guesses the legislature, as in Brown and Roe/Casey. Legislative
action also reflects social understandings. Still, the plurality properly pointed
out that stare decisi plays a different role when the stakes are very high. Quite
simply, the bigger the constitutional stakes, the harder the fall. When it comes
to the less important cases, the Court can more easily overrule "bad decisions"
because few will notice or care. The Court also can engage in the usual
tradecraft of isolating and distinguishing prior cases to the point of
"abandonment."' 9 It does not matter that much whether or not States have
certain constitutional immunities21 or individuals have a right to pass out
campaign materials at private shopping centers. 211 To put it bluntly, a lot of
constitutional law is not very significant. But there is no subtle way to eliminate
204 Id. at 846.
205 Id. at 854-55.
206 Id. at 861.
207 Id. at 861-63.
201 Id. at 862-63.
209 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal
Formalism and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 155, 191-92 (2006).
210 See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment
immunizes states from citizen suits in federal court); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Floida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996) (holding that the commerce clause of Article 1 does not vest Congress with the
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity). I would reconsider this highly activist doctrine.
211 Pruneard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)
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segregated schools: either the Court overrules Plessy or perpetuates that cruel,
divisive educational system.
Conversely, there is a cluster of cases that the Court will probably not revisit
because of their perceived effectiveness. They are known as
"superprecedents. 212 Many of them are structural, allocating governmental
powers. Most law students begin their constitutional studies with Marbuy i).
Madison and McCulloch i. Mayland, because those cases fleshed out much of the
Constitution's textual structure.
B. The 'Fit" Between Doctrine and Text
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein explained how everyone, including
Supreme Court Justices, uses language as a "game., 213 Words cannot be applied
or understood in isolation. They gain their particular meaning from the
function they play within any particular language "game. 214 For instance, we
don't know what the word "strike" means until we ascertain its functions in
such different "games" as bowling, baseball, lighting a cigarette, criminal law,
and labor law. Each clause within the Constitution creates its own "game,"
creating a subset of technical doctrine: "fundamental rights" differ under the
two Privileges and Immunities clauses ,215 "Substantive Due Process,, 21 Equal
Protection, and the First Amendment. Wittgenstein then observed that we
utilize exemplars to illuminate and justify interpretations.21 Invoking Professor
Hart's famous example, a court interprets the prohibition against a "vehicle in
the park" 218 by determining that ordinance's purposes (which in turn requires us
to determine the consequences the law was trying to encourage and prevent)
and by considering a particular situation that many (hopefully most) of us
would consider a clear violation, such as a drunk who plowed his truck through
the park's flowerbed. If we disagree on "easy cases," it will be hard to move
forward. Eventually, particular cases create "core rights" and "core powers"
that are supported by "core examples." Almost by definition, these decisions
will be harder to overrule than peripheral instances. For example, it would be
212 See Mfichael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204 (2006).
213 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note -, at 5e, Aphorism 7.
214 Id. at 6e, 109e, Aphorisms 11, 340,
215 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); see also Saenz P. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (right to
travel under the Privileges or Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
216 See, e.g., Griswold v. Conneaitut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to heterosexual
marriage).
217 Wittgenstein, supra note -, at 34e, Aphorism 71.
218 Hart first proffered the heuristic in Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 607 (1958).
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far more disturbing if the Supreme Court eliminated Brandenburg v. Ohio's vitally
important incitement test, which both on its face and as applied created the
judicial ban on viewpoint discrimination against particular political ideologies,
than if the Court no longer protected lap dancing or internet obscenity. Just as
Justices evaluate statutes to determine how well their chosen means serve
legislative ends, so Justices reevaluate prior Supreme Court opinions to
determine how well they "fit" with a particular constitutional text's purposes.
Although it would take at least a law review to develop the points made in the
prior paragraph, R-A. 1/. v. St. Pauf'9 provides a good example of Wittgenstein's
methodology in action. Although the liberal wing concurred in the judgment,
the case has remained notorious because it prevented the criminalization of
"hate speech."22 Just like Justice Kennedy in Romer, Justice Scalia reconstrued
the challenged statute so many times that it became a straw statute. But Scalia's
straw statute was worth burning down. According to Scalia, the law was one-
sided, applicable only to white racists and other politically incorrect segments of
our society, not to those whom the City believed had been historically
oppressed.221 RA. 1. fits well into the existing First Amendment doctrinal
universe by reinforcing the core right of "political speech" '22 2 through the "core
doctrine" of viewpoint discrimination,2 23 both of which advance the First
Amendment's primary goal of protecting robust debate so the people can make
informed political and personal decisions.224 Although there are risks in
allowing racists to express themselves, there are greater dangers of political
oppression, distortion of the electoral process, and damage to individual
225autonomy if the State can criminalize one side's arguments.
RA./. also gains strength because it is difficult to design a better alternative.
The inability to come up with a better approach is a major indication that a
particular law or legal doctrine is "well-tailored." The concurring liberals
believed that the defendants' speech could be suppressed under a better drafted
219 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
220 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 822-33 (1993); Akhil
Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. RUNV.
124 (1992) (arguing that Reconstruction Amendments may provide a constitutional home for
"hate speech" statutes).
221 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391-92.
222 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626 ("Political speech, of course, is 'at the core of what the First
Amendment is designed to protect."' (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003)).
223 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
224 See POPPER, supra note -
225 See generally Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theor, 145 U. P\.
L. RENT. 193 (1996).
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statute falling within the "fighting words" exception." ' But Scalia had a telling
response: the State's power to ban fighting words does not include the lesser
power to ban a subset of politically unpopular fighting words.22 The liberals'
position seemed to permit the government to ban obscene movies that criticize
the government.22 Finally, general laws proscribing harassment, threat, and
assault have worked reasonably well in preventing the spread and damage of
hate speech.
C. Purposes and Consequences
Aristotle perceived that prediction was a major rhetorical tool. Political and
legal advocates assert that their solution better serves a particular society's
chosen ambitions.229 They also warn of catastrophic consequences should they
lose. Justices on the Supreme Court often foretell cataclysmic results if their
views do not prevail. Every lawyer has used the "slippery slope:" the immediate
issue may be close, but ruling against my client will create a dangerous
precedent. 23() To some degree, the Court can rely upon "the test of time" to
determine which of its earlier prophets were right or if the decision generated
unintended consequences. To paraphrase Karl Popper's description of the
scientific method,231 the Court makes doctrinal propositions that may be
refuted by subsequent events. Of course, the scientific analogy does not carry
very far. There are no double blinds in constitutional law: we cannot rerun
opinions to see what would have happened if the Court had acted differently.
Causation is often attenuated; we cannot be sure how the Court's doctrine
influenced culture over time. Verification also fluctuates depending upon the
nature of the issue and the outcome of the case. If the case is a relatively
unimportant component of constitutional law, it will be difficult to demonstrate
its overall effect on society. Conversely, should the case be a "watershed"
decision, central to our culture, it will be difficult to determine what would have
happened if the decision had gone the other way. For example, it is possible
226 R.A.T ., 505 U.S. at 413-15 White, J., concurring) (invalidating the statute on the grounds
that it had applied the fighting words doctrine too broadly).
227 Id. at 386-88. In his concurrence, Justice White accuses Justice Scalia of creating an
"underbreadth" doctrine. Id. at 402.
228 Id. at 388.
229 See ARISTOTLE, 1 Rhetoric, reprinted i, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2160 (Jonathan
Barnes ed. &J.O. Urmson trans., 1984).
230 "Slippery slope" arguments have been dissected and discussed in great detail in legal
scholarship. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Sl'ppery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1985); see also Eric
Lode, Slippei' Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1469 (1999); Eugene Volokh,
The Mechanisms of the Sl'ppe, Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003).
231 See Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics
2002) (1963).
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that Gerald Rosenberg and Derrick Bell correctly concluded Brown was
insignificant232 or counterproductive,233 but we fortunately never will be able to
verify those claims. More fundamentally, legal "prediction" or "refutation"
invariably consists primarily of normative assessments of subsequent events
and of public reactions, placing the entire inquiry in the land of "ought" instead
of Popper's scientific world of "is." There will be no consensus over the
consequences, even assuming a causal link between legal doctrine and cultural
evolution. Roe's defenders point to positive changes in family life, particularly
increased female autonomy. But for some of Roe's critics, that change is another
deplorable aspect of the opinion.
Whenever the Court determines a law be unconstitutional, it is harder to
determine the costs and benefits of the original law. We are cut off from many
subsequent facts that would help us determine if the Court or the legislature
had initially acted properly. The legislature no longer can gather evidence to
justify its law. This empirical obstacle is yet another reason for a presumption
of constitutionality. For instance, when the Court held that the death penalty
was not a cruel and unusual punishment,234 the Nation has continued to wrestle
with the issue. The public and the legislature will determine if the death penalty
should be used aggressively against convicted murderers, limited to massive
terrorist attacks, or eliminated. There are plenty of statistics and chilling
anecdotes to support both positions. More recently, the Court refused to
prevent a city from aggressively using eminent domain power.235 Responding to
an angry electorate, many States passed laws or constitutional amendments
limiting that power. Thus, the issue remained in the public domain, where all of
us can study which approach works better. Federalism's experimentalism
flourishes under a regime of judicial restraint.
D. Changed Circumstances
The Casey plurality emphasized two versions of the "changed circumstances"
test: the Court can change law when it discovers new facts (Chief Justice
Warren wrote that prior generations did not understand how segregation
injured black children)23 or it develops a "new understanding" of pre-existing
facts. 23' These two formulations can be misleading; because they make the
232 See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
(Univ. of Chicago Press) (2008).
233 Derrick A. Bell, Silent Covenants, Brown v. Board of Education and the Unfulfilled Hopes for
Racial Reform (2004).
234 Gregg . Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
23 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
236 Brow,, v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
237 505 U.S. at 854-55.
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Supreme Court look merely ignorant when sometimes it also may have been
venal (it is often impossible to determine when a person or institution is acting
as a fool, a knave, or both). For example, there are several ways to view Plesy:
(1) The Court did not know what was going on; (2) The Justices drew the
"wrong" inferences from the facts; (3) New developments demonstrate that
they had an inadequate data base; (4) Subsequent developments inspire
different jurisprudential perspectives creating a different set of inferences;
and/or (5) The majority understood the facts and accepted the outcome. Both
Brown and Casey placed their predecessors in the first four categories: the Lochner
jurists had not lived through the Depression, which undercut, at least for a
while, the allure of market fundamentalism, 23 1 while the Plessy Court was
unaware of modern sociological findings.23' Furthermore, the Court and
American society had evolved and learned from its past "mistakes." But Justice
Harlan's stirring dissent in Plessy reminds us that the Plessy majority grasped
the moral, political, and legal implications of Southern apartheid.2 1 That Court
apparently did not care, supported the suppression of blacks, or felt impotent
in light of foreseeable backlash. In a similar vein, the Lochner Justices
understood the competing economic philosophies, preferring laissez faire and
deregulation over the belief in unequal bargaining power between labor and
capital, which they saw as an unconstitutional purpose. The Casey approach
demonstrates the Court's extraordinary discretion. If five Justices on the Court
conclude that "society" has determined that the "facts" have changed, then the
challenged opinion is truly history.
E. Stare Decisis and Two Forms of 'Judicial Restraint"
Zelman v. Simmons- aris ? culminated a long campaign by judicial conservatives
to reinterpret the First Amendment to permit school vouchers for private
religious schools. Another example of formal equality, Zelman can be broadly
interpreted to hold that States can distribute vouchers to private religious
schools so long as they do not discriminate among religions nor discriminate in
favor of religions.243 Many opponents believed this holding would devastate
238 Casg, 505 U.S. at 861-62.
239 Id. at 863.
240 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896).
241 Cf. id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Every one knows that the statute in question had its
origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by
blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.").
242 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
243 Ze/ma, 536 U.S. at 662 (emphasizing that the Ohio program was "entirely neutral with
respect to religion").
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inner city school systems, 44 while advocates argued that it would provide
parents, particularly inner city parents, with more options and put needed
competitive pressure on often corrupt, inadequate public school systems.245 By
lifting the pre-existing constitutional ban, the judicial conservatives allowed the
electorate the opportunity to assess the costs and benefits of vouchers. So far,
the change has not yet been profound. Very few school systems have
implemented a voucher system. 46 Where vouchers have been permitted, many
parents have chosen to remain in the public school system. The results of
increased privatization have been mixed: some children have obtained access to
superior educational opportunities,24 while others have become exploited by
private schools primarily designed to enrich their founders.248 The fight is bitter
and political. Not all voucher advocates are primarily concerned about children:
many simply want to reduce taxes. On the other hand, many opponents are
interested in keeping public school jobs and tenure. In short, both sides have
strong constitutional and policy arguments. That constitutional doubt warrants
keeping the voucher issue in the political domain so the experiment can
continue.
Stare decisis's presumption of continuity creates a different conception of
"judicial restraint" than the presumption of constitutionality, which restrains
the Court from invalidating actions of other governmental entities chosen by
the electorate. Stare decisis restrains Justices from overruling their predecessor's
actions, not from overruling the actions of other parts of the government.
Thus, stare decisis can perpetuate prior antimajoritarian judicial activism as well
as prior judicial restraint. On the other hand, doctrinal stability reduces the
Court's visibility, because rival factions do not expect as much out of the Court
in the future and because less happens during the present. Usually, stare decisis
works below the surface: the Justices simply refuse to grant certiorari.249 By
helping keep the Court out of the political limelight, stare decisis preserves the
image of the Court as a "legal" institution rather than a political one. Any strict
distinction between law and politics approaches the absurd, because all legal
244 See Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HAR\. L. REN. 163,
168 (2002).
245 See Michael Leo Owens, Wh9 Blacks Support Vouchers, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 2002, at A25.
246 As of fall 2007, only twelve school voucher programs had been implemented in the United
States. Patrick J. Wolf, School Voucher Programs: What the Research Says About Parental School Choice,
2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 415, 417 (2008).
247 Wolf, supra note -, at 435.
248See, e.g., Bruce Lieberman, Clock is Ticking for TIP Academy: Charter School Has Until
Friday to Answer Conflict Allegations, SAN DIEO(o UNION-TRIB., May 25, 2008, at B1.
249 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theo,, 60 GLO.
WrASH. L. RE\ . 68, 78 (1991) (arguing that "precedents perform a crucial role in constitutional
decisionmaking by framing the Court's decisions on whether to grant certiorari").
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decisions are a form of political/practical reasoning, of choosing between
competing interests. Nevertheless, Americans need to believe that they live
under a "rule of law" as well as a "rule of politics." The Constitution, the Court,
and the legal/political system would lose a great deal of adhesive power if
Justices bluntly said that they decided a certain case to benefit the supporters of
the political party that selected them in the first place."" Humans coexist by
engaging in "willful suspension of disbelief," partially believing in and being
dazzled by a Wizard of Oz's pyrotechnics while also knowing that a regular
person pulled levers somewhere behind all the gloss. Major cases invariably
tend to strip away the useful fiction of the law/politics distinction.251 It is hard
to take the legal arguments in Bush v. Gore2' 2 very seriously when every Justice
found an argument that supported the Presidential nominee most likely to
appoint similar Justices to the Supreme Court, and every Floridian official
proposed a solution that benefited their Party. Does anyone really believe that
the case would have gone the same way if it had been entitled Gore v. Bush?
F Reliance, Rights, and Structures
While bad facts are said to make bad law, difficult cases often generate clumsy
arguments. In Casgi, the plurality shifted the justification for the abortion right
away from Roe's emphasis on medical autonomy to concerns over bodily
integrity and a woman's right to family planning.253 However, that welcome
move was accompanied by the claim that it protected women's "reliance"
interests. 24 At first blush, "reliance" seems an odd metaphorical doctrine,
because the Court was protecting future abortions. 255 To use Fuller and1 : • • 251
Purdue's famous contract distinction , the Court actually protected an
25o See Casey, 505 U.S. at 865-66 (O'Connor, J., pluralit opinion) .
251 The law/politics dichotomy helps maintain the legitimacy of the Court and, consequently, is
an interpretive example of Lon Fuller's "legal fictions." LON L. FULLER, LEGxAL FICTIONS
(1967). It is a "meta-legal fiction." Fictions are "not intended to deceive" and serve an
invaluable emotive function in "induc[ing] conviction that a given legal result is just and
proper." Id. at 6, 54.
252 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
253 compare Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (framing a women's decision as a part of her relationship with
her physician) and Case, 505 U.S. at 857 (conceptualizing Roe as an exemplar of liberty
"decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child" as well as "a rule ... of personal
autonomy and bodily integrit.")
254 Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
255 The plurality acknowledges that the use of the term "reliance" may appear inapposite,
"except on the assumption that no intercourse would have occurred but for Roe's holding, such
behavior may appear to justify no reliance claim." Id. at 856.
256 Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J.
52, 54 (1936).
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"expectancy" interest. Reliance protects prior decisions. 25' Even the Casey
Court agreed that reliance is more applicable to the "commercial context.,
258
The Court partially escaped this confusion by noting that it was perpetuating
part of a culture that Roe helped create by making it much easier for "women to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation., 259 This broad
conception of "cultural reliance" applies to any contentious, important case. All
law helps establish underlying culture.2 ° Southern whites relied upon their
superior status during the segregation era, but that "reliance" interest is
despicable.
To the degree that "reliance" is a legitimating factor, it should be more
applicable to "rights" cases than to "structure" cases, which distribute public
power. Vulnerable and emotional, individuals have a greater need for
continuity; they can be emotionally and even physically damaged by
constitutional change. Bureaucracies adapt more easily to redistributions in
power than emotional individuals. If one looks at the public reaction to recent
constitutional decisions, most citizens care far more about rights cases than
structure cases. 26 1 Admittedly, the categories overlap. Expanding state
immunities against tort suits under the Eleventh Amendment involves both
structures and rights. But those cases, which stripped millions of people of a
crucial damage remedy, have generated little public debate compared to such
issues as affirmative action, school prayer, and abortion. Thus, a pure structural
case, such as I.N.S. i. Chadha 62 or New York i. United States, has a lesser claim to
stability than a mixed case or a pure individual rights case.
Nor should all rights cases be given equal stare decisis weight. Some rights
protect actions that have little or no effect on other people, "innocent
delights" 263that easily satisfy John Stuart Mill's libertarian principle protecting
people from state regulation so long as they do not injure anyone else.264
Because there is no conflicting interests (unlike abortion and affirmative
action), there is little reason to revisit the Court's recent protection of gay
257 Id.
258 Cas, 505 U.S. at 855.
259 Id.
260 MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW 102-104
(1997).
261 This is reflected in the news coverage, which emphasizes individual rights cases. Ethan
Katch, The Supreme Court Beat: How Telerhion Covers the U.S. Supreme Court, 67 JUDICATURE 1, 10
(1983).
262 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
263 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government; and a Letter Concerning Toleration 155-56 (Ian
Shapiro & John Dunn eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690).
264 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 21-22 (1859).
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sexuality in Lawrence. Criminal procedure falls in the middle of this libertarian
spectrum: on the one hand, procedural rights protect all individuals from the
state; conversely, those rights make it harder to punish victims' perpetrators.
Other rights, such as the right to an abortion and the right not to be racially
discriminated against by affirmative action, are zero-sum games. It is not
surprising that these issues generate the most heat. Overall, the Court should be
most willing to reconsider any case that prevents the legislative branch from
dealing with intractable, enduring political conflicts.
G. Judicial Theory, Partisan Politics, and Public Opinion
There must be a moment when all sitting Justices size up a new member to
determine which prior decisions may now be narrowed, abandoned, or even
overruled. Chief Justice Rehnquist quickly moved to overrule a death penalty
case after David Souter joined the Court.2 ' Rehnquist explained that the prior
cases were decided by a five-to-four margin containing "spirited dissents." '266
Since then, more and more dissents aspire to be "spirited." In Justice Scalia's
case, most of his dissents are not just spirited, but also acerbic. The "spirited"
adjective raises both methodological and normative concerns. How are we to
determine when an opinion is "spirited?" Also, this factor encourages shrill
opinions, undermining internal institutional cohesiveness, reducing public
civility before an already polarized citizenry, and dissolving the useful myth that
law is a profession of principle, not just a reflection of contemporary partisan
conflict.
On the other hand, passions, some hot and some cooler, animate every
outcome. As Holmes famously said, "law is the felt necessities of the times. 26
In other words, law consists of emotions transformed into power. Anger
distorts, but also inspires. Justice Scalia's dissents make unpleasant reading for
many, but they are peppered with sardonic wit and insight. Thus, a "spirited
dissent" immediately serves several purposes. Merely by existing, it becomes a
legally acceptable ground for reversal. It sends a signal to losing lawyers that
they may eventually prevail if political fate provides additional sympathetic
Justices. Depending upon the stakes, the Justice also appeals to the broader
community, particularly his or her political allies. Justice Scalia bitterly claimed
that Lawrence's legalization of homosexual behavior was a liberal victory in the
"Culture Wars." 268 More recently, Justice Breyer read an angry dissent from the
265 Payne v. Tenessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), ovenru/ing Booth v. Wary/and, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
266 Payne, 501 U.S. at 828-29.
26 Holmes, supra note -, at 477.
268 539 U.S. at 602 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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bench in Parents Invo/ved to emphasize his despair at the majority's unwillingness
to permit cities to implement integration programs at public schools.
269
Professor Guinier subsequently showed how community organizers have used
Breyer's dissent for political as well as legal purposes.270
1. Public Opinion
While few Supreme Court decisions capture the public imagination, most never
register. At best, they spend a day on the front page of the New York Times. For
example, it is unlikely that many people are aware of Parents Involved (although
many more know and care about Hellers and McDonald's protection of firearms
under the Second Amendment). Nor has there been much outrage over the
partial birth abortion decision. It is not easy to predict public reactions. Many
people, including Justice Blackmun, were surprised about the widespread,
continual hatred of Roe after the mild response to Griswolds protection of
contraceptives.2 1 More often than not, judicial restraint is met with more favor
because it less disruptive and validates pre-existing governmental and popular
preferences already filtered through the electoral process. Although the Burger
Court was not as conservative as some would have wished, it made a series of
decisions protecting suburban, middle-class lifestyle. States were under no
constitutional obligation to integrate suburban schools via busing212 or
suburban neighborhoods via housing.2 3 Nor need suburbs share their wealth
with inner city schools.214 Mall owners could protect their shoppers from
distracting political protesters. 2 5 Plaintiffs could not prove racist intent in
housing or jobs requirements simply because a facially neutral law had a
disparate effect on minorities.2 6 All these constitutional compromises may or
may not be justifiable under many progressive moral theories or interpretive
methods, but the best reason not to revisit them is that they reflect Aquinas's
observation that rulers should prudently operate within a particular society's
constraints. Aggressively reconfiguring suburban life would embitter millions of
citizens who would have little or no immediate political recourse.
269 Oral Opinion of Justice Breyer, Parents Involvedin Community Schools v. Seattle SchoolDist. 127 S.
Ct. 2738 (2007), available at http: vww.oyez.org/cases/2000-
2009/2006/2006 05 908/opinion
27( Lani Guinier, Foreward: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2008).
271 See Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun: Harry Blackmun's Supreme Court
Journey 135-39 (2006).
272 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
273 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
274 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez_411 U.S. 1 (1973).
275 Lloyd Cop. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
26 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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2. Stare Decisis and Legal Theory
After the public has initially reacted to a particular case, debate over most issues
shifts to the elite: lawyers, law professors, business leaders, economists, political
scientists, governmental officials, and so forth. At that point, interested opinion
leaders propose theories to rationalize or attack particular opinions, trying to
create a coherent pattern out of the somewhat random process of
constitutional adjudication. After Edwin Meese retired from serving as United
States Attorney General, he inspired the conservative "originalist"
21movement. Owen Fiss proposed "antisubordination" as a major normative
standard.218 John Hart Ely recommended a more process-based approach
policing the democratic process. To the degree that these visions continue to
attract attention and support, they become another way to appraise prior
Supreme Court opinions, another substantive stare decisis criterion. Continuing
popularity among the intelligentsia establishes legitimacy.
For example, no decision was more politically provocative in recent years than
Bush i. Gore, when five Justices determined who should be President. Although
the actual outcome was very debatable- the Court should have remanded the
Court back to the recalcitrant Florida Supreme Court with clear directions for
counting ballots so the voters would have the "last word"-Bush v. Gore's
underlying rule of "equal voting procedures" coexists with the three theories
mentioned above. First, one can reasonably assume that the Framers wanted all
eligible votes to be counted the same way. Next, voters who have their vote
excluded in one precinct but not in another are subordinated to voters living in
laxer regions. All voters are also oppressed by election officials, who have
excessive discretion. Third, equal electoral standards reinforce Ely's belief that
the Court's primary obligation is "representation reinforcement," the protection
of the democratic process. 219 More generally, formally equal standards reduce
corruption, increase accuracy, legitimate the system, and are inherently fair.
Future liberals should not overrule Bush v. Gore; they should expand it. 2  For
example, they could hold that the constitution requires a paper trail for every
major election to monitor compliance.
277 See Johnathan George O'Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional
Histor 133-61(2005).
278 Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107 (1976). Fiss
designated the standard as the "group -disadvantaging principle."
279 Ely, supra note -, at 88.
280 CJ. Adam Liptak, Bush P. Gore Set to Outlast Its Bezefiiag
, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2008, at Al.
(2011) J. JURIs 369
HeinOnline  -- 10 J. Juris 369 2011
Ti IF1JOURN,\I JURISPRUDENCE
a. Originalism
Over the past few years, constitutional scholars have focused on the role of
originalism in constitutional interpretation. The continuing endurance of this
methodological formalism, which looks only to the "original understanding" of
a text, is puzzling to some of us. Its persistence demonstrates that the quantity
and quality of supporters, on and off the Court, can be as important as anything
else. Over twenty years ago, Professor Powell assembled massive evidence
supporting his conclusion that the Framers were not Originalists.281 Thus, to be
an Originalist meant not following the Framer's jurisprudence. Furthermore, it
is hard to determine what the Framers, much less the general populace, meant
when they voted for a Constitution containing a multitude of clauses. It is
difficult to remain a pure originalist, even within a single opinion. How can one
reconcile Justice Scalia's claim in He//er that the Court should determine the
"scope" of the Second Amendment by looking at the original understanding
with his reassurance that citizens do not have a right to a machinegun or a
sawed off shotgun because people "typically" do not keep such guns for
"lawful purposes?, 28 2 How does he know? Isn't his definition of the right being
largely determined by present customs, not ancient understandings? A sawed
off shotgun resembles a blunderbuss. It would be handy if burglars entered
one's home. In future years, many frightened homeowners might "typically"
want such weapons.
But these technical problems are secondary
. 
A serious commitment to
Originalism (assuming one can find one "right," "clear" answer to so many
contemporary questions in the scrolls of history) requires a massive dose of
judicial activism: Justice Thomas doubts the constitutionality of the New
Deal.283 Relentless Originalism threatens many important doctrines that most
modern conservatives, who tend to be Originalism's warmest advocates, wish
to retain: corporations currently have significant constitutional rights; the
Federal Reserve Board is relatively autonomous and can print paper money;
and public schools cannot segregate the races.
Some Originalists attempt to solve this activist problem by tolerating the
constitutional status quo: stare decisis trumps Originalist findings.2 14 The Court
should "sin no more," exclusively using Originalist approaches in the future.
281 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of OginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. RiV. 885 (1985).
282 Helle, 128 S.Ct. at 2815 16.
283 See, e.g., Lope, 514 U.S. at (Thomas, J., concurring)
284 See, e.g., Richard Primus, When Should Ornina! Meanigs Matter, 107 MICH. L. RrV. 165
(2008). Primus quotes Justice Scalia, who concluded that stare decisis was an "exception" to the
requirement of originalist interpretation. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FFI)mRAI, COURiS AND 'n ti L\W 140 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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Stare decisis has become a huge trump. But why shouldn't some prior decisions
be overruled? Most Originalists would invalidate Roe v. Wade, the case that
helped stimulate Originalism. Also, if there are good, real-world reasons to keep
cases that do not fit into the Originalist straightjacket, those reasons should
trump an abstract interpretive theory. If the Court ought to overrule Roe
because it emerged out of the oxymoronic doctrine called "substantive due
process," it seems the Court should also overrule Griswolds protection of the
use of contraceptives and Bolling v. Sharpe's285 ban of racial segregation in the
District of Columbia. There are many reasons to overrule or preserve Roe, but
they extend far beyond the debate over interpretive method.
b. Antisubordination and Anti-tyranny Principles
As mentioned above, many liberals want to revive the "antisubordination"
principle, which includes concerns about tyranny but questions many more
injustices. 286 While that principle has legislative value, I am wary of applying it
rigorously at the constitutional level. It is rather obscure and disturbingly broad.
Every State has a legal system that creates a hierarchy, which contains an
element of subordination. Furthermore, the principle provides little guidance
when rights collide. In Parents Involved, for instance, the white parents who
wished to send their children to nearby schools were subordinated by school
officials who wanted to place the children in less integrated schools.
Admittedly, the parents had not endured the historical, systemic subordination
of African-Americans, but they were coerced. The anti-subordination principle
also forces the Court to readjust the nation's political economy. The poor and
the working class have been among the most oppressed groups over the past
few decades. Although it would be inspiring to reconfigure the Constitution to
help fight the perpetual class war on behalf of the many, that struggle should
primarily be fought within the elected branches.
The great conservative thinkers Edmund Burke and Michael Oakeshott feared
political, economic, or legal theories that were highly abstract, celebrations of
"reason." Such theoretical thinking, which often makes a fetish out of
consistency, easily generates decisions that are out of touch with the body
politic, which is hardly monist. The elite seduce themselves with their alleged
"rationality." Reductionist thinking, whether interpretive or substantive, is
particularly hard to apply to constitutional law. Each text in the Constitution
provides a different set of interpretive problems, because each clause serves
particular, sometimes conflicting purposes which may also conflict with other
legitimate purposes served elsewhere in the Constitution).
215 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
286 Siegel, supra note .
(2011) J. JURS 371
HeinOnline  -- 10 J. Juris 371 2011
THE JOURNALJURISPRUDENCE
Nevertheless, all of us use abstractions to regulate behavior. Our society
sometimes strongly feels the need to create consistency by creating a general
value/norm that is often described in the legal realm as a "principle." For
instance, under the First Amendment, it is crucial to preserve "viewpoint
discrimination" and slightly less strict scrutiny of "content discrimination."
Consequently, liberals should not revisit Rosenberger v. Rector,28 which held that
Universities had to provide any committed support to all student publications.
The University of Virginia could not discriminate against those students who
wrote about religion because they were engaging in a "religious activity," which
was defined as any activity which "primarily promotes or manifests a particular
belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality."'288 The scheme had many
problems. First, it was difficult to implement-can the University refuse to give
money to atheist Marxists or Darwinists? 289 Second, it discriminated against a
cluster of beliefs, placing the "religious" below the "political," "cultural," or
"artistic. ' 29 ° And what is "ultimate reality" anyway? Finally, Rosenberger is worth
retaining because it all but holds that blasphemy laws are unconstitutional.
Incidentally, the religious students have a good argument that they were being
subordinated.
Originalism is inherently stale, antisubordination excessively broad, and Ely's
protection of the democratic process too narrow. Assuming Originalism,
antisubordination, and representation reinforcement are useful, but insufficient
interpretative tools, where else should the Court look? Most of us can find
constitutional common ground via our opposition to tyranny. The Framers
understood that tyranny can arise in many ways.291 While this article can only
sketch the argument, the goal of "tyranny prevention" helps determine which
constitutional issues are really important, which "fundamental rights" are more
"fundamental" than others. The list of "core rights" arguably includes the rights
to run for office and vote for political leaders, to dissent, to assemble, to be
287 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
288 Id. at 822.
289 Id. at 836-37.
290 Id. at 831-32.
291 John Locke defined "tyranny" as "the exercise of power beyond right, which nobody can
have a right to. And this is making use of the power one has in his hand, not for the good of
those who are under it, but for his own private separate advantage." Locke, supra note , at
188.
292 Although the fictional Justice Handy may not have been speaking for his creator, Lon Fuller,
Handy argued there are only a few "fundamental rules of the game:" "the conduct of elections,
the appointment of public officials, and the term during which an office is held." Lon Fuller,
The Case of the Spelunchea, Explorers, 62 HARv. L. RE'\. 616, 638 (1949). But Handy extended the
notion of "fundamental rights" to protect the bizarre "free civilmoign system." Id. at 639. Fuller
may have been ironically intimating that once a jurist extends the notion of "fundamental
rights" beyond the basic electoral system, all bets are off.
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safe from summary incarceration by the government, to not be a slave or live in
an apartheid or virulently sexist system, to be protected from confiscation, and
to live in a society that rejects any Divine Right of Presidents. After such initial
applications of the general principle, "tyranny" may not provide much more
guidance that "Natural Law." Some will say banning abortion is tyrannical;
others will reply that killing a fetus is the shocking injustice. Noam Chomsky
believes corporations are a form of private tyranny.293 Despite these problems,
the prevention of tyranny is a reasonable place to stop the process of
legal/political abstraction and make a constitutional stand, lest we spin into an
infinite regress. There are many reasons to oppose tyranny in its myriad forms,
but the core "reason" is a self-evident, intuitive value: "All men are created
equal., 294 While Americans disagree over many issues, few of us want to see the
nation degenerate into tyranny. The abortion dispute will not go away, but most
Americans oppose a Taliban-like culture that systemically degrades women.
Returning to free speech doctrine, the "fit" between "viewpoint discrimination"
doctrine and the "anti-tyranny" principle is very tight. It is hard for government
officials to overwhelm political opponents as long as dissenters can openly
express themselves and influence future elections.
If the prevention of tyranny is our primary constitutional concern, it is
necessary to look all prior decisions, not just those won by conservative
Justices. Stare decisis should not protect any tyrannical decisions. The principle
uneasily coexists with Hamdi v. Rumsfe/d 295in which seven Justices permitted the
government to incarcerate citizens without providing full Article III Court
protections. Most importantly, alleged terrorists do not have a right to a jury,296
the institution that Jefferson called a "sacred palladium of liberty.,,29' The
Trias 298 Josef K may end up with more procedural protections than those the
Court eventually provides to alleged terrorists under the malleable Mathews v.
B/dridge due process balancing test.2 99 The Obama administration's plan to
assassinate American citizens who are suspected of terrorism (but not on a
293 See NOAM CHOMSKY, CHOMSKY ON ANARCHISM 192 (2005); "Consent Without Consent"
ReJections on the Theory and Practice of Democragp, 44 CLEV . ST. L. REV. 415 (1996).
294 See The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
295 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
296 Id. at 533 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (only requiring "notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a
neutral decision maker"); contra id. at 570 (Scalia and Stevens, JJ.., dissenting).
297 Letter from Thomas jefferson to james Madison, Dec. 20, 1 787 in The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson Vol. 6: Containing His Autobiography, Notes On Virginia, Parliamentary Manual,
Official Papers, Messages And Addresses, And Other Writings, Official And Private 385-93
(Andrew A. Lipscomb ed.) (2007)
298 Franz Kafka, The Trial (1925).
299 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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battlefield) is another tyrannical development. 3 Hamdi is the worst decision
since Buckly i. 1/,aeo30' (Buckly and its progeny, Citens United, involve the
related problem of "corruption," which, if unchecked, is often a precursor to
tyranny). Because "amdi enables the government to round up citizens, it has
the potential for great evil. If a citizen faces indefinite detention in a nay3 brig,
most other constitutional rights are of little value. Flamdi falls within the
important, "controversial" decisions that Casey wrestled with, even though
Hamdi has not provoked much academic or public outrage. One can only hope
that "new facts" or "new understanding of the facts" will someday lead to the
burial of these woefully misguided decisions. Maybe widespread torture and
murder will make the nation reevaluate Hamdi.
c. Electoral Backlash
Just as there can be "backlash" when the Court expands a right, as it did in
RoeiU2 and Brown,"3 there also can be public outrage when the Court contracts a
right or makes other significant changes.3 4 Supreme Court Justices need to be
prophets-guessing the likely impact of their decisions and public reactions.
Once again, Aquinas' conception of prudence is salient: the Court needs to be
wary of imposing too many of its imaginings on the populace. Every time the
Court is judicially active, it regulates other officials who more directly represent
the citizenry. In his famous article on judicial restraint, Professor Thayer
described the art of judicial review as "that combination of a lawyer's rigor with
a statesman's breadth of view.""" The Court is one of our society's managers;
we only hope it can help steer the nation through its inevitable problems
instead of adding to them.
The Court is not an Olympian institution. There is a more disturbing
component of judicial forecasting that is rarely discussed, a factor Justices never
include in their opinions even though it lurks about every controversial
decision: sometimes, they should consider how a decision could influence
future elections. Because it is absurdly easy to make conventionally acceptable
constitutional arguments without including this troubling assessment, Justices
will never admit to engaging in such a crass calculus. They probably would deny
they even think about such things. Because powerful people have tremendous
3()( Glen Greenwald, Confirmed:Obama authorizes assassination of U.S. Citizen, Salon, April 7.
2010.
301 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
302 See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash.
303 See, e.g., K1arman, supra note -
304 See Eskridge, Jr., supra note -, at 1314.
305 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 138 (1893).
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capacities of self-rationalization, they may well persuade themselves of their
virtue. There is no need to push this irrefutable (and thus unprovable)
argument too far. Perhaps Justices don't think about future elections. Perhaps
they are unaware, even at the unconscious level, of some powerful, rather
obvious reasons why they might consider political as well as cultural
consequences. But there is no reason for outsiders to be so proper. Even if one
believes that the Court operates on a less sordid plane, one can obtain an
illuminating perspective that seems to have a fair amount of predictive and
analytical power, by analyzing the Court in terms of partisan politics. For
example, whether intended or not, the conservatives rush in Citizens United to
dramatically expand the role of corporate money in the 2010 election helped
move both parties to the right, just as Buckle previously undercut the more
progressive wing of the Democratic Party.
As Bush v. Gore demonstrated all too crudely, Justices have a strong interest
(whether aware of it or not) in having new members of the Court who are
sympathetic to their ideology. All Justices want to win future cases and not see
their prior decisions reduced to footnotes. In other words, Justices do not just
read election returns: they influence future elections and may make calculated
forecasts. This creates another stare decisis problem when Justices reconsider a
decision they probably would have initially rejected. The party faithful expect
"their" Justices to champion many of their causes, yet too many victories in one
direction enrages the opposition and expands its base (after Lawrence, it has
become easier for libertarian gays to join the Republican Party). Supreme Court
nominations are one of the great spoils of every Presidency. And Supreme
Court decisions are the great spoils of the Court. Over time, a bloc of Justices
rewards its allies more than its opponents. Thus, whatever else can be said
about Heller and McDonald, it was a victory not just for the National Rifle
Association, but also for every person who has a rifle in the back of a pickup
truck. A future liberal majority should be very wary of revisiting Heller. Neither
side of the Court has done much for rural white society and the working class
over the past few decades. Once these voters no longer have to worry about
their right to keep their rifles and pistols, many of them will be more open to
progressive messages and more likely to vote for a party that would appoint
more liberal Justices who would then support liberal statutor) changes.
At least from the perspective of those who are not members of the Court,
taking future elections into account is a valid normative criterion. I am more
interesting in seeing the society become more humane than in seeing many of
my preferred norms receive constitutional protection. Sometimes, it is
preferable to trade off constitutional outcomes for electoral victories. Many of
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us would rather have progressive control of the elected branches than a federal
constitutional right to a gay marriage (as important and as valid as that right is).
Justice O'Connor, the last Justice to win an election, had great instincts at
creating doctrine and outcomes that resonated with much of the populace.
Whether one looks at her overall work from the perspective of Thayer's
"statesmanship" or from the political perspective of keeping moderate
Republicanism in power (at least for many years), she created a constitutional
settlement of many controversial issues that both sides should be wary of
disturbing. There is a "core right" to an early abortion. Affirmative action is
permissible only in higher education. Religious private schools are eligible for
vouchers. Gays cannot be arrested. Sickly citizens have an obscure "right to
die." If either side profoundly alters these doctrines, their corresponding
political party may pay a high price. Elimination of the abortion right would
anger many men and women. Eliminating vouchers would alienate inner city
parents and those who wish to send their kids to religious schools.
Recriminalization of gay sex would drive many more gays to the Democratic
Party. Most senior citizens do not want to spend their last months or years in
great pain or in a vegetative state (and many seniors live in the swing state of
Florida). Preventing any form of affirmative action would influence the
increasingly important Hispanic vote. Thus, future liberal Justices should
tolerate the Court's determination that public schools, unlike Universities, could
not use race as a factor in Parents Involved. Liberals should live with legislative
constraints on late-term abortions, which are quite grisly and understandably
upset many people. There will be plenty of new problems for future Justices to
handle-the treatment of suspected terrorists and their captors will raise
painful legal issues, such as whether victims of American torture should obtain
damages. Hopefully, the Court will not permit the Executive branch to kill
citizens without any trial. And there remain numerous technical issues, such as
the scope of federalism and federal court jurisdiction, to provide fodder for the
professionals.
It is probably naive to hope for a constitutional cease-fire over the culture wars,
but that is this article's recommendation. If Justices on both sides see judicial
restraint toward precedent to be in interests of themselves, their party, and the
nation, there is a better chance to resolve other important issues that have been
ignored. But there is an important qualification. This approach is not a version
of constitutional minimalism. Occasionally, the Court needs to be very
aggressive, as in Brown.
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H. Better Reasoning
Justice Brandeis believed a case should be overturned whenever there is "better
reasoning. ' 306 Because "better reasoning" contains any and all ideological
assumptions, his recommendation goes too far. All majority opinions contain a
cluster of reasons that were publicly acceptable when the case was decided, so
no easy way exists to determine when a competing set of reasons is "better."
Brandeis is almost suggesting there is a "right answer" to difficult constitutional
issues. Whether one agrees with this article's normative recommendations or
not, its compilation of stare decisis factors reveals how constitutional reasoning
contains numerous considerations that cannot be reduced to a simple syllogism.
If the Court revisited every case whenever five Justices thought they had better
reasons than their predecessors, stare decisis would be a very thin reed. It is
worth re-emphasizing that one of the functions of stare decisis is to encourage
Justices to tolerate earlier decisions that they initially rejected (or would have
dissented from had they been on the Bench). The legal realist Karl Llewellyn
once wrote that every legal decision needs a "singing reason," a fit between
justification and outcome that resonates with lawyers' informed intuition. 7 The
values served by stare decisis intimate that the Court should accept prior
decisions even when they are quite out-of-tune. Good decisions should be
retained and bad ones overruled, but tolerance ought to be shown to the merely
ugly.
V. Coda: Applying the Model to Citizens United
Early in Justice Kennedy's Citiens United02 opinion creating a new right for
unions, non-profit corporations, and all for-profit corporations to spend
unlimited amounts of "independent" money from their general funds to
support or oppose particular politicians, he claimed that stare decisis does not
"compel" his slender majority of five Justices to abide by a contrary outcome,
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce09, decided twenty years earlier. This
article's catalogue of stare decisis variables demonstrates that stare decisis never
compels anything. It is a norm that competes against other constitutional
values; the very complexity and malleability of the doctrine confirms dissenting
Justice Stevens' observation that policy considerations drive constitutional
adjudication.') While Kennedy and Stevens disagree on many levels, they
focused on four stare variables: (1) the "workability" of the existing doctrine;
3o6 Bunet, 285 U.S. at 406 408 (1932) (dissenting opinion).
3o Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 210-15, 493-96 (1960).
3o8 558 U.S. _ (2010).
309 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
31 Citizens United, 558 at (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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(2) the antiquity of the precedent; (3) the reliance interests created by the
opinion; and (4) the quality of the challenged decision's reasoning. 311 Justice
Roberts' concurrence emphasized the amorphous, slightly romantic "rule of
law." None of the Justices used the Casey methodology of first characterizing
the issue as major and then determining if there has been a widespread cultural
shift that undermines the prior decision. For anyone concerned about the
increasing concentration of wealth and power in a few hands in this republic,
Citizens United is a profoundly important opinion, similar to Lochner, Plessy, and
Roe v. Wade. And there is no consensus, on or off the Court, for giving
corporations more power at the expense of average citizens. The ironically
tided Citizens United diminishes the average citizen's power.
Citizens United relied heavily upon formal equality: citizens, individuals, and
associations should have identical free speech rights. The Court observed that
the challenged doctrine not only discriminates against certain associations, but
it also favors media corporations over those corporations that do not have
direct access to traditional forms of mass communication. The new, sweeping
doctrine is admittedly more "workable." Congress will have less power and be
less accountable for the corrosive role of money in politics: anyone can spend
unlimited amounts of money to help elect anyone. The Courts will have less to
do. Perhaps the majority will permit Congress to limit foreign corporations'
spending, but its reasoning points in the opposite direction. Anyway, a clever
foreign corporation can pad a contract with a friendly American corporation,
which then can support sympathetic, grateful politicians. Under the prevailing
rhetoric, politicians only provide "access" to their donors and are never
"corrupted." Lochner should remind us that the attractively abstract and
universal nature of formal equality often elevates intellectual and doctrinal
purity above the inevitably grimy world of partisan and economic politics.
Formal equality transcends time-ignoring past injustices, present imbalances,
and future inequities. But this transcendentalism can glide over many of life's
complexities. More pragmatically, the Austin approach proved workable: both
the political and the legal system have not had much difficulty enforcing this
limitation on corporations since it first appeared in 1907.312
When Justice Scalia was often in a minority, he would invoke "tradition" to
constrain liberal judicial activism. Now that he is part of a small majority that
might evaporate if President Obama's election signifies a shift to the center or
even to the left, Scalia and his colleagues focus on "the antiquity of the
precedent." Their baseline is 1990, the date of Austin, not 1907, the year of the
311 Id. at and (Stevens, J., dissenting).
312 ABC News, In Supreme Court Ruling on Campaign Finance, the Public Dissents (Feb. 17,
2010).
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first legislation conditioning corporate power. The majority described Austin as
an anomaly, simply because nobody had previously thought there was a
reasonable chance that the Court would so dramatically jump into the political
thicket. Nor has there been widespread opposition to Austin, except in The
Federalist Society and the Chamber of Commerce. Lochner interfered with
legislative efforts to fight the Depression; Plessy legitimated southern apartheid;
while Roe still provokes outrage. Austin has been the quiet target of the modern
conservative intelligentsia; Justice Robert's confirmation odes to judicial
restraint and precedent seem far less convincing. Most public opinion polls
taken after Citizens United revealed widespread opposition across party lines: a
Washington Post poll found eighty per cent disagreed with the Court.
313
Kennedy next all but eliminated the "reliance" standard by equating it with
contractual and property rights.314 Indeed, reliance is most useful when
considering the constitutional status of common law rights. But we have
already seen that reliance does not fully capture how Supreme Court helps rule
our nation: there is a notion of "cultural reliance." Many decisions, such as Roe
v. Wade, allocate power and rights that create cultural norms, traditions, and
expectations that should not be quickly discarded. In terms of contract
metaphors, there are also constitutional expectancy interests. For example,
children should not be forced to attend racially segregated public schools. Do
we preserve Brown because of "reliance?" We preserve it to protect all of our
children's futures. We oppose racism because it is a pernicious force that
divides and degrades everyone. Many of us want to reduce private power,
which relies heavily but not exclusively upon the corporate form, to protect the
Republic from instability caused by the weakening of the middle class and the
degradation of the poor. We agree with Aristotle that republics become
unstable when there the rich become too powerful or the poor too numerous
and demoralized. We are not just preserving the past; we want to protect the
future. Justice Scalia wailed when the Court entered into the "culture wars" by
protecting homosexuality315, but eagerly wades into the class war that is more
central and enduring. Overall, it is hard to take seriously all the "conservative"
talk of Originalism, judicial restraint, and keeping the Court of politics.
Echoing Brandeis, Kennedy found Austin not "well reasoned."3"' Stevens' tests
were more limited, asking if the prior case is "dead wrong" or "irreconcilable"
313 linterpreting polls is a risky business, particularly when applied to more enduring
constitutional law. Polls in early 2010, for example, also showed a surge in support for
Republicans, who presumably would appoint more Justices favoring Citizens United.
314 Citizens United, 558 at
315 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
316 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
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with prior precedent. Both approaches reflect the insularity of most
constitutional rhetoric. In major cases, the outcome is far more important than
the "reasoning." And who knows when a case is "wrong," much less "dead
wrong?" After all, Kennedy's opinion is filled with legitimate First Amendment
norms and metaphors: the challenged law reduced core political speech by
criminalizing a limited group of speakers' speech, thereby interfering with the
"marketplace of ideas."'31 But the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor begs the
question of "market failure" and "unequal access" to the market (similar to the
debate over "unequal bargaining power" that animated Lochner). The
deregulated marketplace of ideas favors the best funded ideas, not the best
ideas. Still, it is hard to say that Kennedy's approach is "dead wrong;" the text
of the First Amendment limits Congressional power to suppress "the freedom
of speech." Constitutional law is nothing like math or formal logic, where there
really are right and wrong answers. We need to look beyond judicial reasoning
to find adequate criteria of "wrongness."
Aristotle observed that the perpetual struggle between the few and the many
reflects competing conceptions of "partial justice.318" ' He saw this as a
fundamental constitutional question. All classes have legitimate claims that can
be framed in terms of equality, justice, and fairness. The poor have "equality of
citizenship" and the rich have "equality of merit." It is hard to say how wealth
and power should be distributed. There is no magic test determining when a
legitimate aristocracy, which provides needed leadership, becomes a perverse
oligarchy pursuing its own interests at the expense of the common good. That
uncertainty justifies significant judicial restraint concerning the role of money in
politics. For those of us who believe that the Court should use its autonomy to
limit private power, not enhance it319, the decision is a disaster. Perhaps the
system would be more corrupt if Congress had more control over its own
elections. But the voters, which the Court seems so concerned about, could
throw out legislators to create a more responsive system not premised upon
monetary "access." Now, an unelected judiciary has fundamentally changed the
electoral playing field. Justice Kennedy may not feel there is any appearance of
corruption, but he obviously has not been listening to millions of Americans.
For Kennedy, "corruption" is reduced to bribery, which the government can
deal with directly via the criminal law.
The opinions briefly considered some consequences of their approaches.
Kennedy absurdly noted that giving corporations (which are owned primarily
317 Id. at 38.
318 ARISTOTLE, Politics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, Vol II, 2031, (Jonathan
Barnes, ed. 1984).
319 James G. Wilson, Noam Chomsky ajdu1 dia/Review, 44 Clev. St. L. Rev. 439 (1996).
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by wealthy people) more power might level the playing field, because the
wealthy individuals already have so much power: "In the 2004 election cycle, a
mere 24 individuals contributed an astounding total of $142 million to [26
U.S.C. §527 organizations]." There is another reaction to that appalling fact:
starting with Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court designed a system that gave
the rich excessive political power. Citizens United merely compounds and
accelerates the problem. But Kennedy was not worried. He permitted Congress
to require disclosure, which Congress may or may not effectively implement.
During the 2010 elections, many donors gave millions of dollars to support
candidates without disclosure. All other purposes are improper or amorphous.
But Kennedy reassures us that the citizenry will not be discouraged. Perhaps he
and his colleagues have spent too much time in the corridors of power. A
Rasmussen poll in July, 2010, indicates that only twenty-three percent of
Americans believe the government has the consent of the governed. 321
Justice Kennedy and his colleagues claim they are facilitating the electoral
process, somehow empowering the electorate by providing them with more
corporate propaganda and more powerful lobbyists. It seems indisputable that
corporate power will increase as a result of this opinion, that the rich will get
richer and the powerful more powerful. Many of us bemoan the collapse of the
middle class over the past thirty years, but others embrace the concentration of
wealth at the top. The elite prefer a citizenry that is happy to work, consume,
and vote for leaders already beholden to powerful interests. Indeed, most
candidates in primaries are winnowed out based upon their fund-raising skills.
In Discourses on Liiy, Machiavelli claimed that republics were a very strong,
enduring form of government, because they provide their citizens with many
rights, thereby creating a deep allegiance.3 21 So far, the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence has profoundly devalued the crucial adhesive of citizenship.
There is not just one of Llewellyn's "singing reasons" to overturn this recently
decided, closely decided, activist opinion that created a "watershed' moment:
there is a symphony.
VI. Conclusion
Henry Adams observed many years ago in his extraordinary autobiography that
human thought and actions tend to fluctuate between universals and
particulars.322  In some eras, grand abstraction captures the collective
320 Rassmussen Reports, July 16, 2010.
http:/ /www.rasmussenreports.com/public-content/politics/general politics/july 2010.
321 See, NicCOLO IMACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON LnY (Harvey C. Mansfield & Nathan
Tarcov, trans., 1998) (1517).
322 Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1919).
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imagination. During other times, individual details matter more. The Court
follows this pattern, shifting between broader, more abstract interpretive
techniques (such as Originalism, Textualism, "antisubordination," or Ely's
"representation reinforcement") and the more incremental, particularized
common law method. It is possible that the United States is entering a less
abstract era; the ideological hatreds of the Sixties seem pass6 in light of current
economic and environmental difficulties. Many of the rigid, ideological motifs
of contemporary conservatism appear to be fraying. Yet the left is capable of
asubstituting its own ideological litmus tests. Even if the nation has been
enthralled by a flawed, perverted ideology, it does not follow that many of the
Court's recent conservative victories were "wrong" at all, so "wrong" that they
ought to be reversed or limited to their facts, or so "wrong" that they have not
created a cultural reliance interest that would trigger politically dangerous anger
if a resurgent liberal judicial majority undermined those interests. Many liberals,
particularly in the academy, will dislike the reluctance to continually
constitutionalize the divisive cultural wars. But the average American,
irrespective of race, gender, or background, must find common ground, where
he or she is not divided and conquered by the culture wars that benefit the elite
of both political parties and their patrons.
This inquiry has raised a psychological question. What motives reside within
those who tend to prefer law's certainty and continuity-- be it through
glorification of stare decisis, an appeal to Framers' Intentions, or the creation of
enduring bright line rules--and those who consider law to be inherently
dynamic and plastic? Why do some of us gravitate toward a more Platonic
conception of static law and enduring forms, and others feel more comfortable
with Aristotle's fluid jurisprudence and the Buddha's observation that nothing
is permanent? Perhaps one unexplored impulse is the adjudicator's feelings
about death. If law is fixed, then life's rate of change is slowed down and death
is delayed, if not defeated. Furthermore, one's interpretation of law survives
indefinitely. To embrace law's indeterminacy and plasticity is to acknowledge
human subjectivity, humanity, and mortality. Death is essential to evolution.
Thus, this article concludes with intimations of an existential jurisprudence.
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